THINGS AS THEY ARE.

PART THE SECOND.

By the AUTHOR of the FIRST.

Turpe eſt ſibi fucum facere. CIC. de Orat.

LONDON:
Printed for G. KEARSLY, at the GOLDEN LION, in
LUDGATE-STREET.
MCCCLXI.

THE

*SECOND PART

OF

THINGS AS THEY ARE.

WHERE there is ſo admirable a fund of good ſenſe, and conſequently of natural equity, as characteriſes the Britiſh Public, even though an epidemical illuſion of error ſhould unfortunately have prevailed for a time, the principle of recovery from it happily exiſts in that Public itſelf. But that depends intirely on its being engaged to combat itſelf, and to examine itſelf the cauſes of its miſguidance, in which caſe the victory of truth is ſecure.

You may, it is true, juſt at the firſt, diſpleaſe a Britiſh reader by laying before him any opinion repugnant to his own ; but provided he ſees, or

* The Firſt Part was publiſhed the 24th of July, 1758, but written before the arrival of the news of that check which the king of Pruſſia received at Olmutz.

rather feels, you neither attempt to miſlead him by falſity, which he deteſts, or to win him by flattery, which he deſpiſes, you may depend on his ready forgiveneſs either of your reaſoning with him, or of your ſetting him to reaſon with himſelf.

But conſtituted as man is, it would indeed be vain to imagine ſuch candor univerſal to a whole people. We muſt naturally expect ſome exceptions. Such, for example, are thoſe ſubalterns, who are merely under the ſway of private intereſt, to whom it would certainly be doing too much honor to allow them any opinion at all; at leaſt of their own. Yet theſe are they who are ever the moſt cool and rancorous enemies to the partizans of truth, of whom the better they think, they are ſure to ſpeak the worſe. For this they have a double motive. An unſuppreſſible conſciouſneſs of the inferiority of their own part, makes them envy and deteſt the ſide on which they cannot help ſeeing the truth, with all their efforts not to ſee it. Then again they are compelled to appear more red-hot than others to make their patrons and perhaps, at length, themſelves believe that they are in earneſt, and that their zeal is not at bottom rank matter of intereſt. No wonder, however, theſe ſhould look on thoſe as their enemies that could

attempt

attempt to rob them of any thing ſo precious as that falſity they think themſelves bound to defend. They would probably loſe much of their conſequence if they were inliſted only on the ſide of truth, which is never the bribing ſide, tho' ever the moſt richly rewarding one in the ſenſe of honor, as well as of that only ſolid and true private intereſt which is inſeparable from that of the nation.

But of all the abſurdities that the Powers of Falſity, ſo congenially to their cauſe, oppoſe to the repreſentations of Reaſon and Truth, the greateſt ſurely is that of indiſcriminately imputing the expreſſion of any doubt about the wiſdom of public meaſures to party-ſpirit, to private animoſity, or to ſome dirty ſelf-intereſt. To ſay nothing of the ridiculous injuſtice of arbitrarily aſſigning motives from their nature impoſſible to be aſcertained; what can ſuch a ſenſeleſs interpretation imply other than the moſt undeſerved injury to the nation itſelf? What? Here is a nation obviouſly inferior to none in the known world, for natural and acquired advantages, a nation evidently the ſanctuary of Liberty, and the azylum of Reaſon, and which, in that light, very well deſerves to be conſidered as the capital of mankind: and yet ſuch a nation is not, it ſeems, ſuppoſable, among all her natives, to con-

tain one ſubject that from a ſpirit of loyalty, duty, and gratitude, would oppoſe any error he might conceive pernicious to her welfare, without any view but the exquiſite honor of oppoſing it. While any little inſignificant private individual, that can ſet up for a miniſter of ſtate upon the immenſe ſtock of half-a-dozen ideas, and thoſe every one perhaps falſe, is allowed capable of being the head of a party, the nation herſelf is denied the honor of the poſſibility of her having a ſingle partizan for her own ſake. True it is, that this judgment is never formed but by thoſe poor creatures who meaſure the hearts of others by the littleneſs of their own.

Theſe it is, who, when any objections are, with the beſt of intentions, ſtarted to the current conduct of political affairs, hug themſelves on their ſuperhuman penetration and ſhrewdneſs, in diſcovering therein a malicious, envious, or intereſted diſpoſition againſt ſome great man, that may, themſelves can neither tell how nor why, have happened to captivate their confidence, under the circumſtance of having very honeſtly, more than once done on his part, every thing neceſſary to prove how little he deſerved it. Whereas the greateſt probability ſhould be, that any ſyſtem of management acknowledging ſuch an one for its director or comptroller, would, unleſs

unleſs for the ſerious and fatal conſequences ſure to reſult therefrom, take ſo ſtrong a tincture of burleſc and ridicule, as to be beneath all notice, or at the moſt, as to any perſonal ſenſations, could excite but ſuch as one would experience at being forced to ſit out a dull nonſenſical farce.

To the admirers of ſuch a perſonage, even though pre-aſſured of their injuſtice, which cannot however be ſo great as that which they do to themſelves, I wiſh no worſe, than for themſelves not to hold their admiration ſo very cheap as not to examine whether they are not throwing it away, and that their undeception may not come too dear and too late. To theſe too I can very ſafely, and with the cleareſt ſpirit, proteſt, a perfect innocence of any intention to offend, either them, or even him they admire.

Every perſonality and every truth but that which ſtands ennobled by the ſtamp of Public utility, muſt be beneath the attention of the public. And in that Public I preſume ſuch a reſpect for itſelf as for it to admit that a ſalutary truth would come with infinitely more honor, though it were but from ſome obſcure garretteer, than a pernicious falſity from a much lower character, that of a vile court-cloſetteer, who ſhould have ſold ſuch a truth, let the price be what it would ; a gratification either of avarice,

or

or of vanity, or of both, in equal or in different degrees of both.

But among my readers (and what writer is there that does not hope for ſome?) there is a claſs, whoſe diſſent from any opinion I could wiſh to ſee eſtabliſhed, while it cauſes me the greateſt concern, does not in the leaſt leſſen my perfect reſpect for them, and whoſe diſſent is even a public calamity. Theſe are they, who with underſtandings inferior to none, and eſpecially with the cleareſt zeal for the good of their country, have even through that very zeal been hurried away the captives of firſt appearances, and of unſufficiently examined opinions. But ſhall I ſay it? It is even upon the reality of that ſame amiable and praiſeworthy zeal of theirs that I found all my hopes of the influence and perſuaſion of that truth, to which the bottom of their heart undoubtedly belongs, however Error, may have obtained by fraud or ſurprize, a momentary poſſeſſion of the ſurface of their minds. Yes, It is among thoſe whom that zeal unfeignedly animates, that, however contrary their opinion may have been, I depend on the fair and generous acceptance of an intention reſting exactly on the ſame principle as their own; even though they ſhould ſtill imagine they ſee ſuperior

reaſons

reaſons to remain unconvinced and ſubjected to their firſt impreſſions.

On theſe I am ſo extremely far from preſuming to aim at impoſing my own ſenſe of *Things as they are*, that I am very juſtly ſubmitting it to themſelves. And while I am taking them for my judges, there is nothing I would intreat ſo ſtrongly of them as to ſpurn all authority but that of their own reaſon, provided they do their own reaſon the juſtice to give it fair play, by leaving the entrance open to truth, in a ſuſpenſion of all paſſion for the benefit of their judgment.

It is not theſe that will reſent their not being deſpiſed enough for thoſe truths to be ſuppreſſed or withheld from them, for fear of provoking in them a childiſh diſpleaſure, which their intereſt in knowing ſuch truths muſt ſo abundantly compenſate.

By theſe it is that I ſhall dread nothing ſo little as being deemed an apologiſt for France, in my conceſſion of any matter of fact in her favor; eſpecially on my declaring beforehand that whatever truth happens to make for any enemies of this country, that truth I would tell to chuſe, not moſt certainly by way of ſeeking to ſerve them, but of ſerving ourſelves, whoſe ignorance

rance of it can never be of advantage unleſs to our enemies.

We are not, I preſume, as yet, ſo degenerate, ſo unmanned, or ſunk to ſuch abjection of ſpirit, as to be afraid of the truth, or rather, as not to embrace it whenever it offers.

And ſurely it muſt be infinitely better that the pointing out any weak ſide in our cauſe or proceedings ſhould come from the hand of a fellow-ſubject than of a foreigner. A well-wiſher will always combat a popular prejudice or error rather with all the tenderneſs of a friend, than with the acrimony of an enemy towards thoſe who maintain it. He will be ſure to ſhare the pain he will not perhaps be able to help giving, while he is leſs ſollicitous to avoid diſpleaſing, than deſirous to be of uſe in the communication of his ideas on thoſe public meaſures, which in ſome meaſure affect every one from the higheſt to the loweſt of the nation.

Is there, for example, that ſubject in the Britiſh dominions ſo very low, or ſo very inſenſible as that it ſhould be matter of indifference to him whether thoſe bleſſed continental connections ſo railed at and ſo warmly eſpouſed by the very ſelf-ſame man, were made on a Britiſh, on a Hanoverian, or not impoſſibly, in the event, on a French footing: whether the immenſe ſums

exported

exported to keep up thoſe connections are not even worſe, than thrown away; and whether our brave and dear countrymen are abroad on ſervice againſt the *French*, or not on that of their own country, whether, in ſhort, they are actually, (to make uſe of that phraſe ſo quaint and ſo humane) "*periſhing with propriety*" or not?

To examine then *Things as they are* in themſelves, as they are in their own nature and eſſence, independent and in ſcorn of any relation to particular perſons, is the object of the following ſheets; while all the favor requeſted of the reader is that he will do the juſtice to himſelf, wherever he is tempted to condemn, of not pronouncing that condemnation, before he ſhall have judged; or of not doing, in ſhort, what is ſo frequently done, even in points of the utmoſt importance, peremptorily deciding without ever judging at all.

As nothing can be more eaſily demonſtrated than that the French were the aggreſſors in the preſent war, by their commencement of hoſtilities, with every circumſtance of aggravation from cruelty and treachery, in no leſs than three places of America; the repetition of ſo inconteſtable a matter of fact would be ſuperfluous, but for its ſerving for a foundation to the

juſteſt of regrets. A regret that, whereas no political or military operations can deſerve ſucceſs, unleſs authorized by a principle of juſtice, we, having that advantage undoubtedly on our ſide, ſhould palpably endanger the conſequences from that advantage, by embroiling this clear cauſe of ours with a foreign one, I will not dare to ſay abſolutely unjuſt, but certainly an obnoxious one; and an obnoxious one, it evidently is, to ſuch a degree, that humanly ſpeaking, it is much to be feared, that all the fair fruits produced by our own cauſe, will, from the unfortunate inoculation of that, take a rottenneſs at the very heart, that will render them ſo miſerably periſhable, as that it would have been perhaps better, in the end, if they had never been produced at all.

But as in order to provide, before it is yet too late, a remedy for the evils incurred by this connection, it is abſolutely neceſſary, however painful it may be, to probe it to the bottom; let us take a fair and ſuccinct review of the ſituation of Britain at the commencement of this preſent war: a war that France had ſo indiſpenſably provoked, unleſs this nation would have been a traitor to herſelf, and have tamely indured injuries that tended to no leſs than the deſtruction of her trade, her intereſt, and her honor.

We

We were, in ſhort, in a ſituation with reſpect to France, ſtrikingly ſimilar to that in which we ſtood towards Spain in our laſt war with that nation. A circumſtance neceſſary to mention, not, moſt certainly, in any the leaſt deſign to revive a dormant complaint of this nation for the uſage ſhe met with, in the proſecution, or rather in the non-proſecution of that war, but relatively to the preſent one, to remind of very eſſential tranſactions a people ſo apt, in their judgments, to make no uſe of their memory.

To ſay the truth, the nation ſeemed entirely, not only to have forgiven, which might be a very generous part, but to have forgotten, which was a very impolitical one, the cruel uſage ſhe had undergone, in the ſacrifice of her greateſt genuine intereſts, to thoſe ſpurious ones on the continent, that were made the pretext of the ſacrifice.

Then it was that that wretched ſtate-ſubterfuge took place, when a miniſter who ſaw plainly that with his degree of obnoxiouſneſs to the Public, he could not well hope to carry the court-meaſure reſolved on of taking ſixteen thouſand Hanoverians and Heſſians into pay, without the conſent of parliament, with certain circumſtances of mean impoſition on a generous but paſſive people, as to the levy-money: then it

was, I ſay, that the miniſter made a handle of the famous Chippenham election to play off that childiſh trick of diving out of one houſe and emerging in another. Then it was, that under cover of the ſatisfaction that removal gave, and in the heat of the ſcramble of private intereſts, the public attention to its own moſt capital concern was fatally diverted. All operations of the national war againſt Spain were ſoon as abruptly dropped, as the national pretentions, of which there was not ſo much as a word ſaid, at the peace. Nay, even the merit to the houſe of Auſtria in our ſupport of it againſt the ambition of France, at that immenſe expence both of blood and treaſure, ſuffered detraction from the circumſtance of thoſe ſame ſixteen thouſand German mercenaries ſtanding upon our pay-books, which, it was averred, was the whole ſecret of our being intangled in that continental war. That, I confeſs, may not be entirely true. But ſo much is demonſtrable, that, as to the oppoſition of obſtacles to the French ambition, which was pleaded for that deſertion of our own proper cauſe, and for the adoption of that of the queen of Hungary, there was not one of thoſe nations in Europe that were content with the part of ſimple ſpectators, but what were more immediately concerned than we were in the iſſue of

of the French meaſures. And what was the iſſue of ours? An iſſue moſt worthy of thoſe politics of ours, for which our nation is noted even ſo as a proverb. About thirty millions more in debt, not a ſingle national advantage gained, and to crown all, that indignity of yielding to ſend to Paris my-lords the hoſtages, which gave to the French king the air of a conqueror. Nay, he was even celebrated for his unparallelled modeſty in vouchſafing us no worſe terms of pacification.

All this was then remarked; but alas! nothing of it was remembered; when the breaking out of the preſent war with France on a footing ſo perfectly national, might, one would have thought, have put the nation juſtly on her guard againſt any propoſal of a continental connection not evidently on a Britiſh footing; againſt any connections, in ſhort, that ſhould leave the leaſt crevice of a pretence open, through which to ſteal in the re-placing of the Hanoverians and Heſſians on the Britiſh pay-books.

But no. The ſparks of the preſent war, of this war all our own, were ſcarce broke out, before Hanover, Hanover, with its ruinous importance, muſt at all rates and by all means be dragged into mention and notice. And here I ſolemnly declare, that I mean no reflection upon Hanover. It is

but

but juſt, but fair to conſider the ſubjects of that electorate as in ſome meaſure our fellow-ſubjects: nay, to conſider their intereſt as ſo much an undivided one with ours, as, in the good we muſt naturally wiſh to ourſelves, not to forget that good very juſtly allowable to reſult to them from our proſperity. No apoſtrophe, in ſhort, could be more ſenſible than that not unfairly ſuppoſable one of Britain to her ſovereign, "If you love "Hanover, do me good, or, at leaſt, do not "injure me, even for the ſake of Hanover."

At the ſame time it muſt be obſerved, that it might not be unpoſſible, even from an overſtrained predelection for that electorate, to take meaſures pernicious both to itſelf and to this country. In which caſe this country, ſo very liberally ready, in compliance to her ſovereign, to laviſh her blood and treaſures in the ſervice of his foreign dominions, might however very juſtly, and without impeachment of that complaiſance, repine at her blood and treaſures being laviſhed to no better purpoſe than to indanger or ruin thoſe very dominions. That would indeed be hard. But facts will beſt ſhow whether this has been the caſe or not.

I have obſerved that this war was a war all our own. Hanover had not the leaſt concern in it. This is what I preſume no one will conteſt, ſince

ſince it is even made one of the capital arguments in favor of the meaſures taken for the ſafety of that poor electorate.

The open rupture then between Britain and France was ſcarce reſolved, before the affectation of fears for Hanover from the French was induſtriouſly broached, and laid the foundation for bringing it into play. The word affectation is not here made uſe of without deſign or without reaſon. Let the reader himſelf judge.

The war being ſo much our own, nothing can be more plain, than that there exiſted not the leaſt color of plea or the leaſt ſhadow of poſſibility of any German mercenaries being employed by us, while the war ſhould continue on purely a Britiſh footing. Hanover is happily ſo ſituated that the French muſt have joined to the moſt infamous injuſtice, which would indeed be no wonder in them, the moſt perfect ideotiſm, for which I do not apprehend they were ever noted, if they had ſo much as formed the thought of marching an army to attack ſo remote a province, not only not worth the conquering, but impoſſible to be held by them by right of conqueſt, without the conſent of the German empire, which there was ſo little likelihood for her ever to obtain. But this ideotiſm ſo juſtly imputable to the French, in the caſe of

their

their attacking Hanover, while Hanover ſhould be truſted to the defence of its innocence, of its mediocrity, of the bond of the empire, ceaſed to be ideotiſm, and became a very wiſe and proper meaſure for them, from the moment that they had reaſon to think the defence of it would be conſidered here as a national duty. This entirely changed the aſpect of things to them. In that point of view Hanover ceaſed to be that microſcopical object, and they would have been fools indeed not to make their uſe of ſuch a weakneſs in our politics as that would be, of renouncing the advantages of our inſular ſituation in favor of an electorate which could only be endangered and never well defended by our renouncing them.

Nothing then being ſo obviouſly clear, as that our inviolable adherence to the wiſe and national proviſion by the act of ſettlement againſt our embarraſſing ourſelves with that province of the empire, was, in fact the part the moſt favorable to that electorate we could poſſibly take, as well as the leaſt detrimental to ourſelves; how came it that we did not make that part our choice? How came it that thoſe fears were given out that were ſo calculated to realize a danger, which without their being given out could never be but imaginary, while, if not

imaginary,

imaginary the fears themſelves, the French only could have the worſt of it in their not being ſo? This queſtion the enemies of Britain will anſwer with pleaſure, her friends with pain; who muſt find it extremely difficult, not to ſay impoſſible, to account for the allegation of ſuch fears, but by the plea they were likely to afford of once more ſaddling the nation with Hanoverian and Heſſian troops.

Now the paſſion for having thoſe troops ſtand upon our pay-books will not appear a whit the leſs credible for the riſk to that electorate, by drawing it into a quarrel of which the iſſue might be fatal to it. They muſt be very little converſant in politics, or qualified to judge of the ſprings of actions in courts, who do not know that their greateſt trueſt intereſts are often thoſe that are the leaſt known or conſulted; nay, that they are often ſacrificed to thoſe little paſſions, or even weakneſſes, of which the knowledge it is that gives the ſureſt key of their conduct.

But if any one in the ſpirit of genuine candor ſhall think the queſtion here begged, in the averment that the danger to Hanover from the French was purely imaginary, and inſiſt that it was abſolutely a real one: that even the conduct of the French in the laſt war, when they forced Hanover into a neutrality, by an army marched

to the borders of it, proves, that, at leaſt, the renewal of the like danger might very well be dreaded, without affectation : if it ſhall be further added, that even the French court had actually thrown out menaces againſt that electorate ; the reader, who will eaſily obſerve that in ſtating theſe objections the utmoſt fairneſs is intended, not to ſuppreſs any thing that may contribute to give a light to the point in queſtion ; the reader, I ſay, will be enabled to anſwer thoſe objections himſelf by the following ſelf-evident conſiderations.

Firſt, If that danger of which the fears were made a handle to bring Hanover into play, was real, and the fears not affected ; ſo much the better for Britain ; ſo much the better even for Hanover itſelf ; always provided that Britain ſhould adhere to that her part of unconcern ; which, while ſhe could never hope effectually to defend Hanover, would ultimately enable her to revenge and repair any wrongs it might have ſuſtained on her account. And, in the mean while, the enemies of France could not have imagined a meaſure ſo palpably big with deſtruction to her troops and treaſures, as the employing them on ſo baſe, ſo obnoxious, and ſo falſe a point of politics, as that of an expedition againſt that inoffenſive province of Germany.

Secondly,

Secondly, Nothing could be a greater confirmation of the juſtneſs of treating any menaces from the French of falling a ſecond time upon Hanover, with the ſcorn they deſerved, than the conſequences of that very ſtep of ſending Maillebois to compel the electorate of Hanover into a neutrality which was afterwards broke, if not for the ſake at leaſt by the circumſtance of ſixteen thouſand Hanoverians and Heſſians being taken into our pay, in ſupport of the houſe of Auſtria. A ſupport in which we were undoubtedly intereſted, but not more than any of the other nations in Europe, who, I fancy, are as little curious of admitting the yoke of France as ourſelves; but a ſupport too, which we might have as effectually given, and have ſickened France as ſoon in our own way, upon the element proper to us, as with ſo much leſs a chance for ſuperiority, on the continent. But by theſe conſequences of the French expedition againſt Hanover, I do not moſt certainly mean thoſe troops being taken into pay on the pretext of the continental connection of that time, by which we were ſo ſhamefully fruſtrated of the benefits of our *own* war, which became from that moment, moſt flagrantly, a *ſine cure*, though not perhaps more perniciouſly than the preſent war is collaterally clogged by

a foreign connection that will, ſo probably, worſe than fruſtrate any benefits by it. No. I mean, that juſt jealouſy and hatred of the French which that ſo iniquitous a meaſure in them rekindled in every truly German boſom. A ſpirit that did the queen of Hungary's affairs more ſervice than even the ſwords which Britons and Britiſh money had, in her defence, drawn againſt France. And of this France is herſelf ſo very ſenſible, that ſhe has been always more ready to grant Hanover a neutrality, than Hanover could be to aſk it, and which, in fact, it has ſometimes rejected. During a neutrality there is always a ſuſpenſion of Britiſh pay.

But to go farther yet, and to ſtate things to the almoſt poſſibility of fairneſs. Let it be granted, that the conſequence to Hanover of a neglect on our ſide, of its defence, would have knowingly expoſed it to what it is but too plain, neither we, nor its ally the king of Pruſſia ſo much nearer at hand to aſſiſt it, could poſſibly help, to the circumſtance of the French getting poſſeſſion of it. What then? It muſt be confeſſed that ſuch an uſurpation is a great hardſhip; but one of thoſe hardſhips, humanly ſpeaking, impoſſible to prevent, or but to endeavour at preventing, without the incurrence of much greater evils or dangers. That hard-

ſhip,

ſhip, that oppreſſion, grievous as it muſt be allowed to be, could, in the nature of things be only temporary ; a tranſient ſtorm. The damages to that province, it would not only have been cheaper, but eaſier for this nation to repair, and, if neceſſary, to revenge, with the applauſe of the whole univerſe. That Briton muſt not have had a ſpark of Britiſh honor in him, that at the making of the peace, would have wiſhed its indemnification overlooked or neglected.

In the mean while that poor electorate would not need to ſcruple or regret its ſuffering a little in the reaſonable view of ſuch a reparation. That poor electorate can hardly complain of its condition having been rendered worſe by its unity of ſubjection to the ſame ſovereign. If, while Britain, with all her boaſted acceſſion of treaſures from her extenſive commerce, only ſees herſelf ſo many millions the more in debt for her continental connections, that poor electorate, never remarkable for any trade, unleſs in hiring out its ſubjects, of which we have had ſuch excellent bargains, could afford, thirteen years ago, to lend, upon a ſubſtantial mortgage, to Saxony ſuch a ſmall ſum as one million three hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling, (and will any one ſuppoſe that this was

its

its all ?) Might it not then very well have born to throw leſs of the burthen of its defence upon us ? Or what would have been better yet, both for us, and for itſelf, might it not with reſolute reſignation have committed its ſafety to the bond of the empire ; and that failing, have truſted for the reparation and revenge of its injuries to a people ſo well diſpoſed towards it as we have ſhown ourſelves, and who, on that occaſion, would doubtleſs have doubly been ſo, with ten times the ability to give proof of that diſpoſition ?

Unfortunately the ſyſtem the moſt ruinous for Britain and for Hanover prevailed. Thoſe fears for Hanover, which, as to the effect they produced, were equally abſurd whether real or feigned, were made the baſis of the ſubſidy-treaty with the court of Peterſburgh, to which half a million ſterling was to be paid for bringing the Ruſſians into the German empire ; an invitation for which that empire has doubtleſs great obligations to us.

But whether the very juſt menaces of his P. M. to the electorate, for a treaty in ſo great a meaſure, and ſo evidently levelled againſt himſelf, that even if he had been expreſsly named in it, the intention could not have been clearer ; or, whether the queen of Hungary would not liſten

liſten to certain preliminary lucrative ſtipulations in favor of Hanover, which ſhe thought too intereſted or too hard a bargain, for both theſe reaſons have been given, and perhaps both are true, this treaty of ours with the court of Peterſburgh was revoked, and virtually annulled, before the ink with which it had been ſigned was well dry, by the ſubſequent one with Pruſſia. The firſt treaty was undoubtedly a bad, a very bad one: may that which was ſo abruptly ſubſtituted to it not prove in the end an infinitely worſe one! But whether either of them was a meaſure taken on the footing of Britiſh councils, let the reader, on the light of his own reaſon, determine from the following conſiderations.

Firſt, as to the Ruſſia-treaty. The remoteneſs of that country from ours and from France, with whom alone we were at war, eaſily points out the aim of that treaty to have been the protection of the electoral dominions, on the part of his late majeſty, as Elector of H------, and on the part of Ruſſia, a premeditated plan of hoſtility; againſt whom? Why even againſt our preſent individual magnanimous ally. But as to the Britiſh intereſt in protecting that electorate by that means, it may be fairly averred, that if in lieu thereof the French would have been ſo ſenſeleſs, and ſo much their own enemies

as

as to accept half-a-million ſterling on the expreſs condition to invade Hanover, and take the conſequences merely as enemies to Great-Britain, and not in the character of auxiliaries to the empire, which would indeed totally change the complexion and ſubſtance of ſuch a ſtep; it would not have perhaps anſwered worſe purpoſes for Britain to have given the French that half-million, which was ſtipulated with Ruſſia to come down into the empire with ſpecial intent to fall upon the Pruſſian dominions, where even their free quarters were implicitly marked out. And, indeed, it is but too probable that that ſame treaty unfortunately for all parties begot, in its conſequences, the pacifying or rather the plaiſtering treaty with the K. of P. of whom it could not well be ſaid, that he was either unjuſtly alarmed or offended at that with Ruſſia, in which our new alliance with all the ſubſequent events, ſeem to have been wrapped up as in their ſeed-bud, and to have proceeded from it.

Secondly, as to the Pruſſian alliance: I preſume it will hardly appear an unfair introduction to the examining whether it was a Britiſh meaſure or not, to ſtate the following queſtion.

Was

Was Britain, ſingly oppoſed to France, reaſonably to be held a match for France, or not ?

If the affirmative is choſen, that is to ſay, if it is allowed that, every thing conſidered, Britain might, without too much hazard, have ventured to have ſtood upon her own ſtrength, and upon that of the treaties already exiſting, the conſequence is evident of the needleſsneſs of a recourſe to an expenſive burdenſome ally, that could only unſimplify our cauſe, diſtract our councils, and by the tenor of a joint and ſeparate engagement, take our own fair honeſt points of view from us, to give us, what ? his, of which it is impoſſible to ſay what they were, what they are, or what they could be. In the mean while, had the war been carried on againſt France on purely a national footing, without ſuch continental rather incumbrances than connections, and much leſs aids, is there any thing ſo overpreſumptuous in imagining that we could have kept topping the French at ſea, in proportion as they ſhould increaſe their naval force; and that if our ſucceſſes had been even leſs, they would have been more ſolid, and atchieved at an incomparably leſs expence ? The Dutch in the infancy of their commonwealth, while they were ſtruggling with the greateſt power then in Europe, for their very exiſtence, for

their lives, liberties and property, could, from their war and their alliances being, happily for them, conducted on a purely national footing, even enrich themſelves and lay the foundation of their following greatneſs during the courſe of a tedious and bloody war. It may perhaps be too much to ſay that this would have been exactly our caſe, but this may very ſafely be averred, that no good reaſons can be given why it might not very poſſibly have been our caſe.

On the other hand, if the negative is choſen, that is to ſay, if it is denied that Britain was ſingly a match for France, and averred that it was a cautious prudent Britiſh meaſure, even but in the doubt of her being a match for France, to negociate a foreign alliance, for the greater ſafety of the nation. Be it ſo. Here is then for contracting an alliance the faireſt cauſe imaginable aſſigned, and, indeed, the only one, that ought to be aſſigned; that of a ſupplement to any deficiency of ſtrength on our ſide. Now though from premiſes ſo evidently juſt it is hardly poſſible to draw a falſe concluſion; or to think of attempting to paſs ſuch an one, the reader is, for his own greater ſecurity, intreated to ſolve to himſelf the following queſtion,

If

If an augmentation of our ſtrength againſt France was the object of the Pruſſian alliance, how could that augmentation be conſulted, in ſingling out of the whole continent that very prince whom we were to pay for the war he was embarked in upon his own account, and who evidently had the greateſt powers in it for his declared enemies? and what is worſe yet, moſt of thoſe his enemies our friends, our allies, our well-wiſhers, till this fatal treaty ſhould make them otherwiſe? Was this the alliance then that was to leſſen that our weakneſs, or caſt the ballance of ſtrength againſt France in our favor? Or will the moſt zealous partizans for continental connections ſay, that this was the one we ſhould have embraced, even if we could have got no other; which indeed would not be to be wondered at, while no other power, in its ſenſes, would venture to connect with a nation that ſeemed ſo thoroughly under the impulſion of councils not her own?

The ſolution of the above queſtion, even by the rules of the plaineſt arithmetic, will ſhew whether, admitting that we did well not to riſk the fighting our combat with France, one to one, we did not pitch upon the moſt unpromiſing ſecond in all Europe. But, alas! even our being thus palpably weakened by this acceſſion of

an

an ally procured under the color of ſtrengthening our party, is not the worſt of this meaſure. The blending a cauſe, ſo inconteſtably a fair one as ours, with his, even granting his not to be a foul one, but only conſidered as ſuch by his lawful judges and peers, muſt not only very unpolitically engage us in a diſcuſſion of right, derogatory from the independence of the German empire, which muſt very naturally conſider this nation, as an abettor of a prince it has thought fit to put to the ban, and of the juſtice, or unjuſtice of which procedure no other nation can have any authority, unleſs applied to by the Empire, to take cognizance of it, but give to our enemies, the French, the colorable plea of imputing all our ſucceſſes againſt them to their aſſiſtence of the Empire againſt thoſe princes of it which are under that ban. A plea of which, ſo falſe and ſo favorable to France as it is, the Britiſh partizans of the German alliance nevertheleſs contribute to eſtabliſh the validity, by admitting what is ſo juſtly deniable, that a war purely national and unadulterated with continental connections (and eſpecially with ſuch a connection too!) could not have been productive of equal, or rather greater advantages, or if leſs, ſtill preferable for their being more ſolid in their being leſs invidious.

But

But granting that this cauſe of his P. M. was originally a fair one, nothing can be more certain than that his own procedure muſt have changed its hue. There is hardly the raweſt novice in the knowledge of the political ſyſtem of Europe, but muſt know that even the emperor himſelf is but the firſt ſubject of the Empire, and dares not, if he reſpects the laws, attack the pettieſt prince of it, unleſs by a legal proceſs.

His P. M. is certainly then not leſs ſubject to the Germanic conſtitutions than the emperor himſelf. Admitting that he had the juſteſt reaſons to ſuſpect Saxony of bad deſigns againſt him, could he be juſtified in ſuch a proceeding againſt this fellow-vaſſal upon a *ſuſpicion*, which even upon a *proof* would not have *been warrantable?* Is it then to be wondered at, that *his* enemies ſhould rather impute his magnanimous pillage of Saxony to the convenience he found in it, than to any motive of juſtice? Was not alſo that ſtrange, that amazing meaſure of incorporating the Saxon ſubjects in his own troops, after compelling them to break their oath of allegiance to their natural ſovereign, and to take it to himſelf, of a nature to be the diſpair of his apologiſts? I ſay nothing of that hard captivity of a reſpectable aged princeſs in her own capital, herſelf ſeparated from her huſband and her children,

dren, and very far from improbably, dying of the conſequences of ſuch uſage. Yet is it poſſible for a Britiſh heart, that known ſeat of good nature and tender compaſſion, not to feel for the miſeries of that unfortunate royal family, and the ſubjects of that fellow-proteſtant electorate?

But let this procedure of his P. M. not move us in a light of humanity; let the mention of it here be conſidered only as mere matter of declamation; at leaſt there can no exception be taken to the mention of it, after the ſentiments of DETESTATION with which the Pruſſian conduct was treated by his late M. "**All the world,*" ſaid his electoral miniſter at Ratiſbon, in the Memorial delivered to the diet in his maſter's name, on the twenty-third of Auguſt, 1757, "*All the* "*world knows that the king* (of G. B.) *abſolutely* "KNEW NOTHING *of the entry of the king of Pruſ-* "*ſia into Saxony; that his majeſty had no intelli-* "*gence of it till* AFTER *the event; that he* DE-

---

* Tout le monde ſçait que le roi a abſolumént ignorè l' entrée du roi de Pruſſe en Saxe, que S. M. n' en a été inſtruite qu' aprés l' evénement; qu' elle a DETESTE' les hoſtilités qui ont eclaté, qu' elle les a détonſeillées; qu' elle n' y a pris, et a declaré ſolemnellement, qu' elle n' y prendroit aucune part.

"TESTED

" TESTED *the hoſtilities that had broke out there;*
" *that he adviſed againſt them; that he had not*
" *taken, and had ſolemnly declared that he would*
" *not take any part in them.*"

Here it would be offering the greateſt inſult to the reader's underſtanding to ſubjoin any comments on the inconſiſtency of ſuch a declaration with the recommendation at that very juncture of time of the Pruſſian alliance to this nation as a PROPER one! I readily then leave it to his own reflexions. I leave it to him too, to conſider, whether this was one of the reaſons to be alledged for a miniſter's *changing* his opinion of thoſe continental connections by railing againſt which, with more than tribunitian fury, he had hectored himſelf into power, and for which he has, no doubt, been ſo unjuſtly reproached, as if, in his change, he had leſs renounced an error than ſold a truth!

Be it however ſaid, for ſuch an one's excuſe, that he ſuffered himſelf to be dazzled, like the meaneſt of the populace, with the glare of his P. M----'s firſt and never ſolid ſucceſſes. A miſtake, indeed, rather to be pitied in ſo great a man, than extremely to be wondered at, conſidering another egregious one of his, in imagining the ſet of people among whom he had thruſt himſelf with ſo good a grace, might catch the " con-

" tagion

" tagion" of his probity ſooner than he the contagion of their corruptneſs, as if it was not, in nature, more likely for a ſound ſheep to get the diſtemper from a whole flock of rotten ones, than for a whole flock of rotten ones to be diſinfected by one poor ſolitary ſound one.

But be that as it may; as to his P. M. certain it is that, though nothing ſo tranſitory as matter of perſonal character ſhould enter for much into political alliances of nation with nation; unfortunately for ours, that circumſtance was too popularly prevalent, and contributed too much to the general infatuation. To ſay the truth, that prince has been extolled by ſome, and decried by others, to the moſt unjuſt exceſs. There is in fact no admiring him without ſhuddering. Nor indeed does any one deſerve the honor of admiring him, that has not, at the ſame time, the ſenſe to ſee, the courage to condemn, and the good nature to pity his errors. The juſtice owing to his heroic qualities ſhould not hinder the animadverſion due to his faults, eſpecially if they are of ſuch a nature as that humanity ſhall have ſuffered by them. In ſpeaking with due praiſe of his magnanimity, do not let it be forgot, that he could not reſiſt the unroyal temptation of putting Saxony to a methodical pillage, nor let it be denied that in more than one occaſion, his virtues

have

have ſuffered ſad eclipſes. Though a very indifferent politician, he may make excellent French verſes, underſtand muſic very well, be a great philoſopher, a great lawyer, a great general, a moſt religious and gracious prince, and yet, with all this conſtellation of excellencies, not in a political light, be a *proper* ally for Great-Britain; nor deſerve to ſet above one man in it a-dying "to kiſs the tip of his little finger." But whatever ſentiments of veneration we may here entertain for this great heroe; at leaſt we can hardly blame thoſe unhappy Germans who impute all the miſery and deſtruction of their country to him, for not concurring with us in that high admiration. It is not very natural for a man to admire much the ſplendor of the fire that is burning his houſe down, or the beauty of a torrent that in its rage is carrying away his family and all that is dear to him.

If it is true that he has declared himſelf the redreſſer of wrongs, of which wrongs, however, there appeared no complaints, and the protector of the German princes; it is alſo as true, that thoſe provinces ſeem bent on not receiving him in that light. Nay ſuch is either their portentous ſtupidity, or their ingratitude, that they have almoſt all leagued againſt him, whether papiſts or proteſtants, and even his own

neareſt relations. They tax him, no doubt, very unjuſtly, conſidering his tender and legal treatment of Saxony, Mechlenburgh, Anſpach, &c. with trampling the great charter of Germany under his horſe's feet, and of aiming to give that great Empire battalion-law. Inſtead, in ſhort, of looking up to him as to their moſt gracious protector, they have treated him rather like a contumacious inſurgent, too powerful indeed to ſerve their judicial proceſs upon, but to which they do not deem him the leſs liable. Nor can it be imagined, that this nation can ſtand in a very favorable or very friendly point of light to them, for abetting a cauſe they have ſo proſcribed, without ſurely being accountable to us for the irreaſons for proſcribing it. But is even the K. of P. himſelf obliged to us for our part as to that career, ſo probably the career of perdition, in which we have encouraged him? Is it at all impoſſible that if the French have felt our enmity to be bad, he may feel that our friendſhip is ſtill ſomething worſe?

And indeed, this ſo admired alliance, well conſidered, does not ſeem to have been, properly ſpeaking, either a Britiſh or a Pruſſian meaſure. Was it a Hanoverian one? Still leſs. Nothing was ever more evident than that, at the commencement of the war, that electorate was in an

intereſt totally oppoſed to that of Pruſſia. That ſuch a diſpoſition then became ſo ſuddenly changed conſidering the circumſtances, it may be fairly preſumed, was not ſo much owing to inclination as to fears, and thoſe not groundleſs ones. And ſurely never was that remark of Cicero more verified, " That the dominion of fear is not of a " durable nature*," than in the conduct of the Hanoverian miniſtry after the firſt engagement it had or entered, or been forced into with Pruſſia, by its dread of that ſtorm which afterwards fell, with ſo much leſs reaſon, on the unfortunate electorate of Saxony; an engagement that did not hinder Hanover from falling a prey to a French invaſion, which Pruſſia either could not, or would not, take the leaſt pains to prevent, nay, uncovered it by withdrawing the garriſon of Weſel. The wiſeſt part then that Hanover had to play, and moſt undoubtedly the moſt deſirable one for Great-Britain, was the detaching itſelf as faſt as poſſible from the ſide of a prince, whoſe procedure, let his cauſe be what it would, was certainly not of a nature for Hanover not

* Timor non diuturni magiſter eſt officii.
Cic. Phil. II.

to ſee the dangers of a connection with him, ſince his procedure had been ſo unjuſtifiable as to be DETESTED by its own ſovereign and ours. And indeed, how was it poſſible for the miniſtry of that electorate, however blind ours might be here, not to ſee the fatal and ſelf-deſtructive tendency of the policy and projects of a prince ſo apparent to his deareſt relations and friends, who, in vain, attempted to diſſuade him? A prince whoſe alliance we were made to think ſo advantageous to us, though not only France had flatly refuſed it, on the pretext of her having been twice left in the lurch by him, but of which even the elector of Saxony ſpurned the offer at the very inſtant that the knife was held to his throat, that his capital and dominions were at the mighty conqueror's mercy, his own perſon, as well as his family, at his diſcretion. Yes! at that very point of time, his Poliſh majeſty preferred all the diſtreſſes, all the horrors to which himſelf, his country, his wife, his children, were expoſed, to any alliance with our magnanimous ally. Can we then well blame the electorate of Hanover for its readineſs to get out as faſt as poſſible of ſuch an intanglement? In this ſpirit of very juſt policy, the convention of Cloſter-ſeven was made, happily for Hanover, but infinitely more yet to the advantage of Great-

Britain,

Britain, who by this means became diſburthened of a continental embarraſſment that could be of no uſe but to ſink both ſtates at once, like two ſhips foundered by running foul of one another in a ſtorm, that, by better ſteerage kept ſeparate, might have held on their way very ſafe, and in friendly convoy to each other.

It is not then for making the convention, that we can condemn that electorate, however we may condemn thoſe that broke it. And here far be it from me to enter into the invidious taſk of ſeeking to bring into queſtion to which ſide the horror of that perfidious breach is imputable. I dutifully hope, and believe, that it lay on the French; as the contrary would arm them with ſuch juſt matter of clamor as that this nation needs not expect ſoon to hear the laſt of it, for that abettorſhip of it which would not only be ſuch a reproach to her politics, but ſuch an indelible ſtain to her annals. The very ſavages reſpect their calumet.

Be it then taken for granted, that it was not the Hanoverians who broke that convention, of which the punctual maintainance was the point on earth the moſt deſirable for this nation; and of which any infringement on the ſide of the electorate, was therefore the leaſt likely to be approved by her. It is a very great pity, how-

ever,

ever, that unluckily that deſpicable, unmilitary rout of Roſbach, in which the French, when oppoſed to the Pruſſians, behaved as if fighting has been leſs their cue than running away, ſince, in fact, they loſt a very few men, ſhould juſt have happened at that point of time when the Hanoverian reſumption of the arms, lain down by the convention, might, by their enemies, be imputed to it. As for Britain, there was very little merit to her in the Hanoverians driving the French out of their country, in which they were periſhing, and in which, moſt probably, their ſtaying was the very worſt thing they could have done for themſelves.

Unluckily too, there was another circumſtance, which, to our great and grievous detriment, concurred to leſſen to the Hanoverians the glory of their conduct, and that is, its not appearing quite ſo diſintereſted as it might have been wiſhed. For even though this poor electorate, amidſt all the evident indigency of its coeſtates in Germany, could find the ſecret of being in a condition to lend them money by millions ſterling, a ſecret to which, by the way, I fancy our nation would have been better pleaſed to have been aſſociated, than either to the politics of that electorate, or even to the honor of its procedure on the rupture of the convention,

yet

yet it could not, it ſeems, afford any pecuniary effort for its own defence, but muſt have recourſe to the pay-books of a nation that was forced to run herſelf more in debt, not only to keep that poor electorate out of debt, but, probably, to enable it, to lend out more millions of money at intereſt.

But if ſuch a circumſtance of intereſt was of a nature to throw ſome cloud on the luſtre of that glorious reſumption of arms, it might be ſaid to have had, even as to that intereſt, ſuch a counter-tendency to a muoh greater one, as to render it ultimately a dreadfully falſe ſtep. But that indeed is no wonder. What paſſion is often ſo ſhort-ſighted or even ſo ſtone-blind as ſelf-intereſt? The being re-plunged into all the dangers of a common-cauſe with a power proſcribed by the whole Empire, and obnoxious to the greateſt part of Europe, was in all good policy ſo undeſirable a circumſtance, that if the ſweets of Britiſh pay were any part of the allurement, ſo much the worſe for Hanover, and moſt certainly ſo much the worſe for Britain.

But let that be as every Britiſh reader ſhall pleaſe to determine within himſelf, upon his review of that tranſaction, as to the honor, policy, and juſtice of it. The particulars of it are notorious enough for him not to need here freſh information,

information, and plain enough for his drawing his own conſequences. But here follows a point of infinite importance for him to judge and form his own opinion upon it from the anſwers he will ſee reaſon to make to his own fair interrogations of himſelf.

If then, at that critical juncture, after Hanover had, by its own pure act and deed, without conſulting Britain, relieved Britain from that burthenſome embarraſſment, when the replacing the troops of Hanover and Heſſe, which was to be the conſequence, I will not dare to ſay, the reward, of that celebrated reſumption of arms; was agitated in the Britiſh councils, that is to ſay if there was any ſuch thing then in exiſtence as Britiſh councils; if, I ſay, at that juncture, one of your hacneyed miniſters, that think all good policy centers in court-complaiſance and in corruption, to which they give that turn, ſo worthy of ſuch heads, in calling it charges of government, had been for hazarding, without the previous conſent of parliament, ſo daring a ſtep as that of once more engaging, and ſubjecting, the nation to a burthen of which it had been ſo happily lightened, where would have been the wonder, but of the unwearied paſſiveneſs of the people to endure it?

But

But if, at that time, there was a minifter who abſolutely owed his being one to the favor of the people, obtained by their once more thinking him, in earneſt, in his frothy declamations againſt continental connections; a minifter by the acclamation of the people; a minifter whoſe being hoiſted into power was a kind of *plebiſcitum*; for ſuch a miniſter, I ſay, to find, in that conjuncture, a *reaſon* for *renewing* that connection, above all others, with the continent, it is a merit in him of which, without preſuming here to ſettle the nature and extent, I ſhall ſay no more than that not the moſt ſanguine of his admirers, can ſurely complain of its being left to his own-ſelf to judge and pronounce. Only, may he, in his judgment, not forget that the acceptance of a great office in the ſtate is ſo bad an epoch of the deſertion of a political principle, that people are too apt to impute it to nothing's being changed, but the perſon's being out of a poſt to his being in one, eſpecially if it is a ſecond or third repetition of the ſame trick!

By means, however, of that moſt expenſive re-ingagement with Hanover and Heſſe, by which this nation is likely to loſe ſo much, without its ever having been poſſible for her to get any thing, the broken link of our alliance with Pruſſia was foddered again: an alliance

that may be ſo clearly demonſtrated to have been neither a Britiſh, nor a Pruſſian, nor yet a Hanoverian meaſure. What was it then? Let the reader himſelf give a name to it; and its moſt appropriate name it will not be very difficult for him to give to it, if he will but conſider its palpable tendency. At leaſt, that of *Antigallican* will hardly be thought a juſt one for it, unleſs, indeed, in the too great probability of its proving, though without doubt unintentionally, on our ſide, pernicious to a power originally raiſed by France into ballance againſt the houſe of Auſtria, and which it is ſo highly reaſonable to ſuppoſe France would conſequently before things were brought to the paſs at which they at preſent are, have effectually interpoſed to prevent being cruſhed: in which light France being weakened, is but ſo much the worſe for Pruſſia, as France may be the leſs able to exert her influence to ſave him.

But there is one truth I will here hazard, a truth ſovereignly unpopular, and therefore only the more neceſſary, and the more meritorious, to hazard it. It is this: The French are very juſtly ſaid to be an unreaſonable people. But they muſt be more unreaſonable yet than they can well be imagined, if they do not forgive us all that we have done againſt them, in favor, mark, not only, of all that we have done againſt our-

ſelves,

ſelves, but of all the ſuperior good they have ſo much reaſon to think will ultimately redound to them even from the very miſchief we have done them.

There was a picture * given ſome time ago in very emphatic terms, of the "diſtreſſed condi-" tion of France, fallen from its alarming pow-" er and greatneſs into the loweſt ſtate of di-" ſtreſs and impotence, unfortunate in its mili-" tary operations in every quarter of the globe; " beaten all Europe over both by ſea and land; " its fleets failing only to be deſtroyed; its ar-" mies marching only to run away; without " trade; no credit; ſtopping payments, pro-" teſting bills, and to all intents and purpoſes " a bankrupt nation; their king, the princes " of the blood, the nobility and the clergy car-" rying in all their plate to be coined, for the " preſent extreme exigency of their affairs; " diſappointed and baffled in all their ſchemes " on the continent; and taught to think no " more of *invaſions* by the deſtruction of the " only fleet they had left." All this is true, or ſo near being the real truth, that at leaſt it is not eſſential here to ſcan exactly the difference. But what of that? What even of the apparently

* Letter to two GREAT Men! p. 8.

fair conſequence which that ingenious writer draws therefrom? *to wit*, "That France una-"ble to carry on the war, will ſoón be reduced "to the neceſſity of *ſuing for peace*." Inſtead of which, it is well known, ſhe has ſpurned with barely not ſcorn and deriſion the offers that were made to her of peace. Alas! the ſolemn truth is, that that diſtreſſed, that beaten, that bankrupt and, I can juſtly add, that ſlaviſh, and in that ſenſe a worthleſs nation, and, as one may ſay, a nation not company for ours, is, for all that, thanks to our politics, thanks to our ſo well choſen continental connections, already, obſerve, already, and without appeal to future contingencies, as good as in poſſeſſion of little leſs acquiſitions than we have got from her in all the quarters of the globe, and, to all appearance, may promiſe to herſelf the being the very greateſt gainer of all the powers actually engaged in the preſent war. A proſpect ſhe abſolutely owes to the part we have fatally taken againſt ourſelves: for it can hardly be ſaid ſhe owes it to herſelf. No. Our blunders are her game, and our want of policy an over-abundant ſupplement to the deficiency of hers.

I ſay nothing of Minorca loſt: let it paſs in the account for nothing. But as to Flanders, of which France is already equal to the being in poſſeſſion,

poſſeſſion, what is there ſhe can have to wiſh for her advantage more than that amazing inſenſibility and unconcern with which we ſeem to behold that country as good as in her poſſeſſion, while our attention is all ingroſſed by Canada, Guadaloupe, Senegal, and add if you will Martinico ? For not all of them together are perhaps above half the importance to France, for a thouſand obvious reaſons, as that acceſſion of dominion in Flanders, nor of ſuch dangerous conſequence to Britain. This is the country, of which even that indolent prince Charles II. who was ſo little of a Britiſh king as to be a penſioner to the French one, had however ſo juſt a conception, and ſo quick a ſenſe of its fitneſs to aggrandize France, beyond all meaſure of Britiſh policy to bear, that he declared that he would take the field in perſon, rather than ſuffer it to fall into her hands. And time and events have been ſo far from bringing any alterations capable of weakening this apprehenſion, that there is actually now incomparably more reaſon than there then was, to dread the miſchief to Britain from ſuch an addition to the power of France, who may keep that country at ſo much leſs expence, and to whom it is ſo much more convenient by its adjacency than to the houſe of Auſtria.

If

If then France could plan a diſpoſition of the minds of the people here, ſhe durſt not, ſhe could not form a wiſh more favorable to her than the preſent indifference and careleſsneſs that prevails here about the hold ſhe already has of Flanders. Nay, ſo fatal is it for Britain by her unaccountable politics to do more ſervice to France than ever ſhe could do to herſelf by her own, which, for example, under Lewis the fourteenth, brought her to the brink of that ruin from which ours ſaved her at the peace of Utrecht; that there are among us here, ſuch as that if they were emiſſaries paid by France to advance her greateſt intereſt, they could not do it more effectually than they very innocently of that intention do; while the fire of their zeal againſt her ſeems to have burnt up all their diſcretion. Theſe are they who, to ſupport the falſeſt of all merits, that of a continental connection on the moſt un-britiſh footing imaginable, will have it, that we could have done nothing for ourſelves without that connection, and that it is to that alone we owe thoſe ſucceſſes, which, if it were true that it was ſo, we had undoubtedly much better have been without. This falſity, however, ſo cruelly, ſo injuriouſly to this nation propagated by thoſe of whom

there

there is at the ſame time no more reaſon to ſuſpect the patriotiſm, than to admire the judgment, ſubminiſters to the French, the faireſt of all pleas of merit to thoſe allies our continental connection has given them ; ſince, as they will very juſtly obſerve, we ourſelves confeſs that our cutting out employment for them in Germany, was the cauſe of all our ſucceſſes againſt them elſewhere. A plea which thoſe allies can hardly not reſpect, or not admit, while there are not wanting even Britons, that with an air of authority atteſt the validity of it againſt truth and againſt their own country.

There are too, who imagine that the loſs of Flanders would only fall upon the queen of Hungary, whom they deteſt, on a notion of her being ungrateful, without their ever ſtanding to examine whether, all circumſtances conſidered, ſhe did not more deſerve to be pitied than to be blamed; whether ſhe was not forced by ourſelves into that unnatural alliance of hers with France ; or whether ſhe did not deſert us till after we had palpably deſerted ourſelves. Such a loſs they then, on their partial view of things, think to be no more than what ſhe deſerves, not cofidering how very hard and how very ſilly it would be in Britain to conſent to the puniſhment of herſelf for the demerits of

the

the Q. of Hungary. And yet this muſt inevitably be the caſe, if Flanders ſhould remain with the French, who ought not to deſire a better chance for their game, than that our being bent on retaining all our conqueſts from them ſhould effectually divert our attention from a point, their carrying which would bid ſo fair to enable them in time to recover them all. The French muſt be ideots indeed if they would not give ten ſuch countries as Canada, that hardly brought them in a ſingle livre, though ſo convenient for us, with Cape Breton itſelf, (the fiſhery of which the revenue of about forty-five thouſand pounds a year was, in fact, nothing equal to the advantage of its being a reſervatory for their ſeamen,) and Guadaloupe, of which the revenue was not near ſo great to them as it may be to us; to give, I ſay, all theſe for the acquiſition of Flanders, on which they have ever had an eye, for very obvious and natural reaſons of ſituation and intereſt. "*Pour s'arrondir* (as they phraſe it) *de ce côté-là.*"

It is very well known that, in the interval between the reduction of Bergen-op-zoom by the French, and their forming the ſiege of Maeſtricht, it was ſtrongly agitated in the French councils, whether, in the conſciouſneſs of their naval inferiority to us, they ſhould not

of

of their own accord abandon their colonies to their fate, that they might throw the whole ſtreſs of their power into their land-operations on the continent, upon the obvious enough plan of ſubduing the Dutch, and having all their ports, ſhipping and ſtores at command. Saxe and Lowendahl were ſtrongly for this reſolution being taken. Perhaps nothing hindered it but the feârs of the empire and of the houſe of Auſtria; of which fears our great politicians have taken ſuch effectual care to diſ-embaraſs them; ſo that a reſolution, which even at that time would not have been perhaps a very hazardous one, is become, in the preſent aſpect of things, eſpecially ſhould the French get Flanders, not only a more practicable one, but even, in ſome meaſure, a neceſſity.

With that advantage then of the poſſeſſion of Flanders, united as they are with Auſtria, and at leaſt on no ill terms with Spain, would Holland be any more than a breakfaſt to them? Or is this proſpect ſo very chimerical, or ſo remote an one, as not to give Britain alarms the juſter and the more wanted for her preſent amazing inſenſibility and unconcern about a point upon which her own ſafety and intereſt ſo capitally depend? ------ Is not the fatal bow-ſtring already almoſt round her neck? And what if, neither

in good policy, nor indeed in the poſſibility, it is not juſt at preſent the time to make her feel the drawing of it ſo tight as to hurt or ſtrangle her; is that a reaſon that ſuch a time may not come? ------- Thoſe keys of Flanders, Oſtend, and Nieuport are already in the hands of the French; and if they needed any excuſe to get hold of the remainder, have not the incidents to which our own conduct have given birth, abundantly furniſhed them with one? And, what is not leſs bad for us, doth not that indifference of ours about it give them hopes and a facility that will be an eternal reproach to us?

But bad as France's getting Flanders may be, with all its conſequences, that is not even the worſt we have to fear; I ſay the worſt, according to the opinion of thoſe who are for ſeeing that territory in her hands, with indifference, ſo we keep Canada, Guadaloupe, &c. It is not at all impoſſible, that ſhe may make that acquiſition, and we not retain even thoſe ſo loudly founded conqueſts of ours, concerning which there are now ſuch grave, deep, and learned diſputes among us, about the comparative value of the one to the other, when it is not abſolutely clear that we ſhall be able to hold any part of them long, or at all, after the peace.

Here

Here if any well-meaning Briton ſhall interrupt me, with an honeſt indignation ; if he ſhall ſay " Who can force us to let go our conqueſts ? " not the ſo often beaten French ſurely ! No, " nor all Europe, while we have a fleet evi- " dently a match for the whole naval force of " Europe. Let them take Hanover and wel- " come : let France take Flanders from that " ungrateful vixen of Hungary ; much good " may it do them with it ! but who ſhall tear " from us Senegal, Canada, Guadaloupe, &c. " while we keep our aſcendant at ſea ? "

To this I anſwer, that I am intirely of his opinion as to the ignominy and folly of making conqueſts only to reſtore them ; but that his indignation will be more juſtly directed againſt the promoters of thoſe continental connections, which not being made on a Britiſh footing will have furniſhed to France the only handle ſhe could have of engaging the other powers of Europe to conſider their reſtoration as a matter of juſtice to her in the plan of the next general peace. But as to thoſe who are for ſlighting or ſetting at defiance ſuch an interceſſion of the other powers, on the principle of our ability to continue the war, and ſtand it out with all of them ; may I aſk the following queſtion :

If after running thirty millions more in debt, of which thoſe ſame conqueſts are hardly more than a valuable conſideration ; if after ſo much of our blood ſpilt, we are however in a condition to brave all or the greateſt part of Europe leagued againſt us ; were not we then, at the beginning of the war, authorized to think ourſelves a match for France ſingly ? Why make of that falſe allegation of inferiority a plea for burthening ourſelves with ſuch a continental connection as muſt ſo probably not only fruſtrate any ſucceſs we might collaterally have, but embark us in the maintainance of them againſt all Europe, with all the powers of which, as a commercial nation, it was ſo much our intereſt to keep up and cultivate the moſt amicable underſtanding ?

As it is, have not we reaſon to fear that with a debt enormouſly increaſed, with a credit rather on the wane, with the live-force of the nation not a little leſſened, we ſhall not have only the preſervation of our conqueſts to provide for, but even the very exiſtence of our nation to defend ?

Is not even our dominion on an element I hope we ſhall always call our own already ſomewhat abridged ? Has not there, ſince the commencement of the war, been an obvious call

for

for our ſending a fleet up the Baltic ? Have we *dared* to do it ? Has not the VETO of more than one northern power been cavalierly enough ſignified to us ?

Have we not been oliged to wink hard at the injuries and indignities of other nations, to whom the fear of drawing more enemies upon us than we already have, (and, to ſay the truth, we have full enow already,) has made us lower our tone, and take very bad reaſons of their miſconduct towards us, for good ones ? A fear we need never have known, if our war had been originally with France alone upon a purely national footing. Is there not a nation, that now actually ſupports France underhand with her treaſures, with whom we are obliged to treat in a kind of deprecatory ſtrain, for which that nation deſpiſes us, though it is her intereſt not directly to break with us : a circumſtance which, but for that fatal continental connection of ours, was perhaps more to be wiſhed than dreaded. So true it is, that when a nation once goes off her own natural byaſs, and adopts a foreign one, ſhe is no longer the miſtreſs of her own ſentiments and meaſures. She can hardly take a ſtep that is not a falſe one.

From the moment then that our cauſe became a double one, by the ſtrange policy of grafting on it ſo heterogeneous an one as that of Pruſſia, we loſt all the ſolidity of any ſucceſſes we might have. And to what purpoſe that ingraftment? It is common, indeed, in dealings, to negotiate collateral ſecurity, but never, as I imagine, to procure, at an infinite expence, a collateral riſk. Such a circumſtance of wiſdom was, it ſeems, reſerved for our politics. In ſhort, after ſuch a miſ-alliance as ours, it became almoſt indifferent what we did. We might take Senegal, or let it alone; take Canada or let it alone; take Guadaloupe or let it alone: nay, add Martinico, if you chuſe it; and yet all this may ſignify little or nothing to the ſum of things, which, intirely in conſequence of a cauſe with which we had ſo little to do, muſt for ever be determined by the fate of the continent, and not by that of thoſe remote and comparatively ſmall objects. Nor does this way of reaſoning in the leaſt detract or derogate from the juſt eſtimate of thoſe acquiſitions. He muſt be an ideot that is not ſenſible of their value, or worſe yet than an ideot to pretend himſelf not ſenſible of it. They ought to be, beyond all doubt, conſiderable,

very

very conſiderable acceſſions to our intereſt, as well as a diminution, at leaſt to preſent appearances, of that of the French. But the more this is true. the more reproachful is it to thoſe whoſe fault it is that ſuch ſucceſſes ſhould be fruſtrated by a collateral foreign meaſure that was ſo ſure to worſe than fruſtrate them. In which light, they give one no idea but ſuch a painful one as, that of ſeeing a ſuperb ſuperſtructure which, the higher it is raiſed from a ſandy foundation, muſt be but the more certain to fall and with the greater ruin.

For thoſe acquiſitions then, if we have not even already paid too dear, in the ſums of money, and in what is more precious yet, in the blood they have coſt us, (may it not be in vain!) is there not too much room to apprehend, not indeed the duration of the war with France, in which, on a maritime footing, ſhe would probably find her account leſs than we ſhould, but of the enmity of ſo many powers in Europe, with whom even the intereſts of our commerce, might make us wiſh to cultivate the ſtricteſt harmony; to ſay nothing of the political convenience to us of their not being the friends of France? And is it not our foreign, our truly foreign politics, that will have made them

ſuch? Or was the firing of the Tower-guns for the ſtupendous victory at the late battle of Torgau, of the Pruſſians over our ſome-time friends and always natural allies, the Auſtrians, an admirable piece of policy in the way of detaching theſe from the ſide of France? Or, if ſo admirable an one, how came that kind of declaration of war againſt the Auſtrians, in favor of our inviolable attachment to our magnanimous ally omitted before, when his two victories, thoſe of Roſbach and Liſſa, paſſed away unhonored with ſuch a demonſtration? Yet that at Roſbach was more particularly our concern, being obtained over the French our *proper* enemies. Account for theſe inconſiſtencies who can? But, certainly, it would be doing a ſimple miniſter too much honor to impute to him a ſtep of ſuch infinite conſequence; as if there was any neceſſity of proving himſelf very capable of puſhing to any length thoſe meaſures which, upon his own authority, might be called the worſt ones imaginable; or of convincing the world, that where his own private intereſt was depending, he could be as unconſtant as the wind, and only obſtinate where the intereſt of the public could very well have ſpared his not giving himſelf the air of being ſo.

Not-

Notwithſtanding, however, the firing of thoſe guns, it may, I preſume, be allowed, without any impeachment of the ſtricteſt loyalty, not only in the light of humanity, but even in a political reſpect, to deplore the fate of Germans unmercifully maſſacring one another, to the great diverſion, and moſt undoubtedly to the great advantage of the French, and of the French only.

Theſe muſt naturally, in every German that is butchered in this civil war, ſee an enemy the leſs to the encroachments they are never but meditating on that great barrier to their ambition, the German Empire. But for that Empire to be divided againſt itſelf, while they have the honor of appearing to ſeek its harmony, and the Britiſh nation has the odium of appearing to foment its diviſions, is ſuch a ſolid triumph to them, that they may well exult in it, and comfort themſelves for the comparatively trifling miſchief we may have done them in their navigation and colonies. In this light then, and to every clearly Britiſh head, I appeal whether it is a falſe light, every clearly Britiſh heart muſt feel with little difference for Pruſſians and Auſtrians periſhing in that deteſtable continental war, through which we have, as it was ſo eaſy to foreſee, been ſo fatally wire-drawn into

a chaos of imbroils " of falſe meaſures, and ex-
" pences without bottom or end *."

Is it not then high time for the people of Britain to ſee through the impoſture of ſuch as have ſo mercileſsly exerciſed upon them the art of procuring them agreeable dreams, out of which, if they do not take care, they will not awaken but too late, in the midſt of inneviſtable ſurrounding ruin and perdition? While all this lulling them aſleep, all this ſoothing, all this flattering them, will have only been to obtain their paſſive acquieſcence in their being fleeced, or ſent to the ſhambles, not only without a ſingle rational proſpect of advantage to this country, but even to thoſe foreign ones upon the continent, to which this country ſeems doomed to be the ſacrifice in vain.

And here I hope the reader will do me the juſtice to obſerve, with what perfect candor, and even tenderneſs, I ſpeak both of Hanover and Pruſſia. Be it right, be it even laudable, for us to have ſtripped ourſelves; to have run in debt over head and ears; and even to make victims of our own countrymen, and all in order to ſave

* Firſt part of *Things as They Are*. P. 40. Third Edit.

or ſerve thoſe foreign countries: but to do all this, to no better purpoſe than moſt probably to *ruin* thoſe countries; to *ruin* them, I ſay; is not that rather too much? And yet this is not all that we have to repine at in ſuch bleſſed politics.------*What more?* Is not there the greateſt likelihood that the French, the French, and all thoſe enemies we ſhall have made, by thoſe politics, ſhould ultimately be the only benefited by them?

Towards clearing up this point, let us but conſider the probable iſſue of thoſe treaſures ſent to feed that war on the continent, which, like impure bodies, could only be the worſe for feeding, This is but too plain, ſince, as to his P. M. at leaſt, it had ſo much of the civil-war in it, that all his victories* could neither grace nor ſtrengthen him. Rationally ſpeaking, they could only inflame a reckoning already too great for him to pay; and inflame it without ſetting him above the neceſſity of paying it; while, it is well, if we are not called upon as being jointly and ſeparately bound with him to

---

* Omnia in bellis civilibus ſunt miſera, ſed nihil miſerius quam ipſa victoria.

Cic. Ep.

make good any deficiency by his inſolvency, eſpecially ſince we are ſo full of the boaſts of our immenſe riches. The glare, in ſhort, of his ſucceſſes, afforded even to his trueſt and beſt friends, no light but the melancholic one by which to read in them the more clearly the greater danger of a cataſtrophe not in his favor. To encourage and abet him then, in ſuch a career, was evidently a meaſure that, in its tendency, rather threatened to procure his fall, than it had the merit of a ſupport to him.

And that he ſhould be ſupported, was obviouſly, for a thouſand reaſons, leſs our intereſt than that of France, who muſt have laughed heartily to ſee us, while at war with herſelf, ſtreighten ourſelves to give thoſe ſums which, but for her diſtruſt of his P. M. or but for the contempt ſhe had of thoſe Pruſſian politics we afterwards, on her refuſal, ſo eagerly adopted, ſhe would not herſelf have grudged to ſupport a power that was the only one capable of ballancing her ancient rival the houſe of Auſtria. Well then, thoſe millions ſo impoliticaly drawn from us went to Germany. There they muſt conſequently, even amidſt all the horrors of war, contribute to augment the pecuniary maſs in thoſe countries. And if that maxim is true,

that

that men follow money, even the temporary depopulation of Germany by the war, may not be very long a repairing, conſidering the amazing affluence of ſpecie to it from ſo many powers making it, as it were, the rendezvous of their armies.

Should then his P. M. happily extricate himſelf out of his plunge, or come off conqueror, which is not quite ſo likely, we are ſtill evidently the poorer for all the ſums exported to Germany to ſupport him. But then indeed we ſhall have carried our point. I do not examine how far from clear it is its being a point, which we ought to have wiſhed to carry; or whether it is not rather the point on earth the moſt favorable to the permanent intereſt of France. ------- That diſcuſſion would lead me too far. But ſurely it is no uncandid ſuppoſition, that in the firſt fair opening to a peace. from any deciſive ſucceſs his P. M. already ſo juſtly tired of the war, and ſo intereſted to get out of it, would hardly wrong that opinion himſelf had given the world, from his treatment of Saxony in 1741, and in more than one inſtance of France herſelf, his natural wiſhed ally, not to mention his conduct to this nation in the affair of the Sileſia-loan. We could not then have been intirely ſurprized if our ſubſidies ſhould have produced nothing

better

better than a ſacrifice of our intereſt, either to his conveniency, or, what is a more gentle interpretation yet, to his neceſſity of a peace.

Yet this ſuppoſition of a ſacrifice of our intereſt, which would hardly be carried the length of his P. M. declaring war againſt us, at leaſt, immediately if but for ſhame-ſake, is even the moſt favorable one. For it ſuppoſes that his P. M. will not, as I ſincerely hope he will not, be cruſhed, nor be the victim of the ſtorm he is accuſed of having himſelf raiſed. But if that ſhould unfortunately be the caſe; thoſe immenſe ſums of ours are not only to our own impoveriſhment, worſe than thrown away in ſubſidies, productive of nothing but the ruin of an ally, for whoſe ſupport their being intended muſt naturally make us enemies of the powers leagued againſt him; but from the very nature of money to enrich and ſtrengthen thoſe countries in which it centers, that conſequence muſt evidently turn againſt ourſelves by thoſe countries ſubmitting to or falling under the conquerors at enmity with us. If this is a forced or falſe concluſion, in what is it a forced or a falſe one?

Alas! there is more yet againſt us, in that application of the cleareſt of our wealth, which were it to go on but a little longer, would make

a guinea

a guinea as rare in the land as an Otho. Nothing is more probable, and for this averred probability I appeal to the beſt judges, the merchants themſelves, whether a very conſiderable part of the ſpecie exported to Germany, intentionally againſt France, is not leſs likely to find its way back again here, than into France; yes, into France itſelf, not only directly through ſo many channels of communication as are open to it, by its preſent intimate connection with the German empire, but alſo indirectly through other parts of Europe, in virtue of its inland-trade, which the deſtruction of its navigation has rather increaſed than diminiſhed.

Nay! Should even ſome of our continental remittances return to us again, in what ſhape would they for the greateſt part return? Still in a bad one for Britain; ſince it would chiefly be in that of loans to increaſe that enormous burthen of her public debt, under which ſhe is already ſinking, while ſhe is forced to appropriate the cleareſt of her revenue to the payment of a tribute, in form of intereſt, to foreigners, whether they are friends or foes, without any advantage to herſelf from ſuch loans, unleſs the throwing away the produce of them, can be called ſo, on bad bargains for ſuccours ſhe could never want, or, perhaps, on ſubſidies ſo

admi-

admirably well calculated as to ruin both herſelf that granted them, and thoſe to whom they are granted.

And here one unſuppreſſible remark is candidly offered to the intelligent reader's own examination. Let him, if he can, name that nation that now is, that ever was, or, humanly ſpeaking, ever can be on the face of this habitable globe, that, its inſular ſituation and naval power conſidered, might, ſo juſtly in point of policy, aſſert itſelf above any neceſſity of paying ſubſidies, as, in point of honor, it is, by its circumſtances, above the receiving any. Nothing would probably confirm this more than a fair hiſtory of our ſubſidies, of their motives and their effects, in which would be ſeen how few, very few indeed, of thoſe burthenſome continental connections could be rightly ſaid to be on a national footing. It would be ſeen that our ſubſidies have been oftenеſt laviſhed away upon powers that or did could do nothing for us; that laughed at us; or that deſerted us in our greateſt need. Some of them indeed very wiſely and thriftily employed the ſums they drew from us in opening new channels of trade, and ſetting up manufactures to rival ours. Others, eſpecially ſome of the little blood-ſhop-keepers of Germany, ſquandered

dered them away on articles of luxury, ſtately palaces, fine gardens, French comedians, and Italian ſingers. At leaſt, it is not all of them, that by the help of our ſubſidies could treaſure up enough to enable them to lend out millions at intereſt.

Compute then the ſums that have been actually no better than thrown away in foreign ſubſidies; compute thoſe expended on continental wars, which, if not upon an unnational footing, were, at leaſt, conducted upon unnational plans of land-operations; add to theſe exactions of the folly of our foreign politics the ſums laviſhed away in domeſtic corruption employed in purchaſing of the ſubjects with their own money, and to the injury of themſelves and their poſterity, their acquieſcence in ſome unnational points, of which unnational points there needs not exiſt a ſtronger proof than that very corruption itſelf, ſince who corrupts to a good, or rather not to a bad end or purpoſe? and how little will the aggregate of theſe articles of falſe expence want of accounting for the whole of the national debt? Perhaps without them the nation, inſtead of being in debt, might have had many millions in her treaſury. What a thought is that? And yet, well conſidered, how infinitely far ſhort of chimerical? But as

it is, at leaſt, we may hope, that when there is not a farthing left to ſpare for the feeding of that monſter Corruption, it will die of itſelf, and in its death bring ſome conſolation to the country it will have ruined.

But how different the conſequences of ſending away all our ſpecie to the continent on a foreign footing, from thoſe of ſending it on a national one to our colonies in America! Where, beſides its teſtifying our juſt and parental regard for them; beſides its enabling them to withſtand and ſubdue our common enemies; beſides its animating their induſtry; after having performed all this valuable ſervice, there is hardly a ſixpence of it but returns into the mother-country, for the further good of its trade and manufactures. Here is no extravaſated blood; but a juſt circulation that diſtributes health and nouriſhment through body and members.

Whereas, if the ſo much greater exportation of caſh to the continent in the ſupport of the war not our own there, ſhould be fairly weighed, and the merits of it ſcanned by its never but obvious tendency and effects, it will not at all found overſtrained or exagerated to aver, that had the money been ſhipped off, and the cheſts of it, without buoys and buoy-ropes, ſunk in the midſt

midſt of that channel which divides the continent from our iſland, but divides it in vain; ſuch a diſpoſal of the money would not only have been better for the country from which it went, but even for that to which it went.

But that nothing might be wanting to complete the beauty of our meaſures, the ſacrifice of money alone would not ſatisfy: but that incomparably more regrettable one of Britiſh lives muſt be added, moſt certainly as little to the honor of the nation, as both the one and the other are for its intereſt. Now this is a point in which no-one that can or dares think for himſelf, which, I confeſs, is not a little rarity, needs dread any impoſition unleſs it ſhould be from his own ſelf. The facts, the circumſtances on which to build a deciſion are ſo manifeſt, that it does not all require any knowledge of court-ſecrets, or admittence into the cloſets of princes to aſcertain the truth.

It is in every man's power, by taking a fair review of the ſtate of things on the continent, to pronounce, from his own knowledge and judgment, whether, ſince the commencement of the war, there did not exiſt a time in which it was proper, commendable, and perfectly right, to make ſuch a declaration as, that not ſo much as "half a man" ſhould go to Ger-

many. If then, ſuch a point of time did once exiſt, will he be ſo good as to try to ſettle, to his own ſatisfaction, in what other point of time it was, that there exiſted a good reaſon for a *change* of that opinion, from any *change of circumſtances*, or at leaſt to ſpecify to himſelf wherein that change of circumſtances conſiſted, unleſs indeed for ten times more reaſon to adhere to that opinion againſt ſending ſo much as "half "a man?" But without proving ſuch a change, for any one, by way of apology for a deſertion of principle, which time and facts render imputable to motives of intereſt or of vanity (it is not five farthings matter which) gravely and ſagaciouſly to produce ſuch an inconteſtable aphoriſm as that "change of circumſtances juſti-"fies change of opinion," can hardly be leſs ridiculous than the Sancho-Panſa ſtrain of picking the Engliſh proverbs, and giving us at random ſuch pretty ones as theſe,---"All is well that ends "well."-----"Succeſs makes a fool ſeem wiſe." "A wiſe man hath more ballaſt than ſail."---- "God hath provided no remedy for our obſti-"nacy."----.---Very juſt, very ſenſible all theſe, if they are but well applied.

But leaving ſuch a defence to its deſerved deriſion, let it be aſked, whether there was a meaſure which, if Belleiſle himſelf had dictated

our

our councils, could have bid fairer for the intereſt of the French, than that, ſince they could not quite ſo conveniently come over to us, we ſhould, at an enormous expence, kindly accommodate them with the tranſport of our countrymen to the very ſpot in the globe they could moſt have wiſhed them, for their courage to be thrown away, and for the little that it could be in their power to do them material damage, while even their victories could decide nothing but the prolongation of the war? Behold them in a territory naturally a friendly one to us, or at leaſt neutral! In a country where, in former days, ſurely not leſs honorable days, Britons made another figure than in their preſent ſubaltern one to a foreign general, who, though himſelf a ſubject, is not even ſubordinate or accountable to that nation which pays that very army and that very general, under whom they are ſuffered to make ſuch a figure! A circumſtance ſcarce to be parallelled in all hiſtory. Would the French, do you think, with all the paſſive meanſpiritedneſs of an enſlavement to deſpotic power have ſubmitted to ſuch an arrangement? Times are indeed changed; but are they, in ſuch a point, changed for the better, from thoſe, in which an Emperor of Germany was but a hired ſoldier, that ſerved in

the

the Engliſh army for his pay, which it is true he did not earn ?

In the mean while the German empire ſhows itſelf determined to look on our troops not as enemies to France, but to itſelf, eſpecially ſince that neutrality which was early offered to Hanover, having been rejected, not at all, you may be ſure, in conſideration of the Britiſh pay, but purely in an heroic view of ſatisfaction to his P. M. for the offence given him by that ſubſidy-treaty with Ruſſia, which was broke, it ſeems, with as much levity as it was made, and certainly with more impolicy. In Germany then, ſo ill diſpoſed towards us, what were our troops to do there ? " Defend Hanover." Was it either worth defending, proper to defend it, or rather was it not calling the enemy, was it not realizing the imaginary danger to it of an attact, by letting it be ſuppoſed that it would be defended by us ?---------" They were to make a " diverſion, to keep the French from contri- " buting to cruſh the K. of Pruſſia." May be ſo. But was it the intereſt of the French that he ſhould be cruſhed ! Might they not, at the beginning of the war, have been very ſafely truſted with their finding expedients to ſave from deſtruction an irreconcileable enemy, to a power naturally their rival, if our politics had

made

not made it ceaſe to be ſo?---------It may be ſaid "Our troops were to protect and ſecure to "the empire its freedom, oppreſſed or in dan- "ger from the houſe of Auſtria." Very well. But does an empire obſtinately ſet againſt the acceptance of ſuch a ſervice, deſerve that ſervice ſhould be done it? Are we, to ruin ourſelves, in order to cram its freedom down its throat? It is often poſſible to hurt people, whether they will or no; but is it in the human power to ſerve people, whether they will or no?--------- "We are acting againſt our natural and proper "enemies the French; we will purſue, we will "attack them wherever they can be incoun- "tered." That is very great to be ſure. But ought we, for that, to have made ſo many more powers our enemies? Ought we for that to have riſked the incurrence of that kind of excom- munication formed by the opinion of univerſal ſociety, which would be ſo much more formi- dable than a papal one, by our eſpouſing, for the ſake of that conveniency, a cauſe, in which, juſt or unjuſt, the procedure at leaſt has, in a very capital part, been ſo deteſtable, and ſo deteſted, even by its now partizans? Are we for that to feed the flames of war in a neutral territory, and abet the devaſtation of provinces belonging to Powers that never hurt us, never

offended

offended us, unleſs in not thinking of the cauſe of one of their own co-eſtates, of which they are ſo evidently themſelves the legal judges, in not thinking of it, I ſay, juſt as we are pleaſed to do?

But granted that the laws and rights of nations are not in the leaſt repugnant to this our ſupport of the Pruſſian cauſe, now fatally identified with that of Hanover and ours, againſt the laws of the Empire, with which we have not the leaſt ſhadow of a diſpute on a Britiſh account, granted; that the ſecondary figure the troops of Britain make under her own ſtipendaries, is highly honorable, and worthy of the majeſty of the nation; what can be ſaid for this meaſure in point of that good policy which always dictates the propriety of commenſurating means to their ends? Was there ever the leaſt proſpect of the troops we ſent effectually anſwering one valuable purpoſe? Was there even, humanly ſpeaking, a likelihood of gaining even by what victories were, or could be gained, any advantage that would compenſate the expence of treaſure and lives, and the odium that muſt be incurred by their being ſent on ſuch an ungracious errand? And yet, have not they already done more than could be juſtly expected, towards fulfilling the object

of

of their miſſion, if their miſſion could be ſaid to have any object? Surely every Britiſh heart muſt bleed, at the reflexion on the hard fate of thoſe our gallant countrymen whoſe bodies, no-one can well tell why or to what purpoſe, have given a treat to the vulturs of Germany; to ſay nothing of thoſe who will probably follow them, who will never reviſit their native ſhore, unleſs perhaps in the letter of ſome ſurviving friends that may think their deaths worth ſpecifying. ------" Oh, but they are periſhing with propri-" ety."-----A juſt conſolation this, no doubt, to their countrymen, friends, and relations here, if that was quite ſo clear as it could be wiſhed. In the mean time, the ſurvivors there were even to be pitied for being expoſed to the nauſeous panegyric of their German general, for their valor; as if their valor had not, in Britons, been merely matter of courſe. Would to Heaven it had been more glorioufly or more worthily employed! But if we had had thoſe forces kept at home, inſtead of ſending them to moulder away in battles to no end or avail, or by inclemency of weather, by diſeaſes, and inanition, we might, without calling in Hanoverians to protect us, have ſafely laughed to ſcorn at any terrors from a French invaſion. We might have done more. We might, with-

out the leaſt rodomontade, in caſe the French had wanted ſhips to tranſport them to this iſland, have obligingly accommodated them with ours to bring them over to the deſtruction that, at leaſt moſt probably, would await them.

But, that nothing might be wanting to fill up the meaſure of our indignities, while our treaſures, and the lives of our countrymen are thus ſacrificed in vain, this diſpenſation of them is even ſet down to us, as a very high favor done us; ſince, at the ſame time, in conſideration of that application of ſo great a part of our wealth and forces, to the ſervice or, more properly, to the diſſervice of our continental connections, we are moſt graciouſly indulged with the leave to employ another part in that national channel, in which the ſucceſſes obtained ſo evidently prove it to have been the only right channel, though from that other collateral diſpenſation, they are ſo likely to be worſe than fruſtrated.

One would here naturally enough imagine that the inſult to the public underſtanding could not well be carried higher than in ſuch a claim of merit to us for what we have been permitted to do on a truly national footing. But this is not all yet. This great, this loyal nation, had

not

not, it ſeems, of herſelf, ſo much intereſt as to obtain that precious favor of doing a little for herſelf in her own way, if but in return for all ſhe was doing ſo much out of it. No. That favor muſt be attributed to the prodigious patriotiſm and powers of oratory in the man who, by pointing out to his countrymen the breach at which their ruin was to ruſh in at, acquired popularity enough for him, on the ſtrength of it, to be thought worth the making a tool of by thoſe who were hard at work on making that breach; whom he accordingly, with portentous intrepidity, joined in the widening it, and took the lead in throwing the whole wall down. But what did the poor, truſting, deceived, deluded people do on this occaſion?---------What did they do? They applauded him; and, with ſongs of triumph, fell to celebrating the wonderful bleſſings of UNANIMITY: Yes! of UNANIMITY!

And here, as we muſt expect, on entertaining the juſt ſentiments of ſuch a deſertion, to be upbraidingly for ingratitude noſed with the remembrance of the glorious year 1759; let us, to avoid and invalidate ſo deteſtable a charge, ſuccinctly liquidate any claim of merit for the ſucceſſes of that remarkable period; ſucceſſes ſo often thrown in the teeth of the defenders of

the inſular ſyſtem againſt thoſe of the continental one; ſucceſſes ſo much of the nature of thoſe phenomenons which, in natural philoſophy, on a ſuperficial view, ſeem to contradict and deſtroy a ſyſtem; whereas, well examined, they only ſerve the more to confirm it.

But ſurely for Britain to have ſome diſtruſt of ſuch ſucceſſes, there needed no more for her than not to forget the year 1757, equally glorious for the Pruſſians, and which yet produced ſo little ſolid advantage as perhaps ultimately at the winding up of things, to be not an unfit companion, for our famous year 1759.

It will not, however, I preſume, be ſaid that, of all the events of that year, I unfairly ſuppreſs the moſt brilliant ones, in ſelecting, for the propoſed diſcuſſion, the reduction of Quebec, the battle of Minden, and the deſtruction of the French fleet by Admiral Hawke.

Firſt, as to the reduction of Quebec, It is extremely well known, that while there was great care taken to ſend a large body of troops to Germany, poor Wolfe was ſuffered to try the fortune of war againſt a "ſuperior enemy *;"

* Wolfe's Letter, dated September the 2d, 1759.

to

to ſay nothing of the great "natural ſtrength "of the country." He himſelf very generouſly takes care to diſculpate, as far as in him lay, the miniſtry, by the following ſalving remark, "The affairs," ſays he, "of Great-Britain, I "know require the moſt vigorous meaſures." -------By theſe "*affairs*" the reader may underſtand or not, juſt as he pleaſes or ſees fitting, the conſequences of the German draughts in our military ſtrength, being ſuch as to require the truſting for more execution to ſmaller numbers than perhaps would otherwiſe have been done. But, let that conſtruction be as it will; is it poſſible to read, without the emotions of a concern mixed with indignation, the immediately following ſo pathetic words, which, reſpect being had to the time, may well be called the laſt dying words of that gallant officer?-----"BUT "THEN," *N. B.* "BUT THEN *the courage of a* "HANDFULL OF MEN *ſhould be exerted only where* "*there is ſome* HOPE *of a favorable event.*" Here you have the ſtrongeſt atteſtation, an atteſtation ſealed with Wolfe's own blood of the deſperateneſs of that undertaking: an atteſtation which, I preſume, it will hardly be ſaid was extorted from him by his *cowardice*. Let all the merit then be granted that can be claimed for the choice of ſo able an officer to command

that

that expedition. So much the greater reproach for expoſing ſuch an officer to ſo ſtaring a likelihood of his being a ſacrifice, together with all the troops under him : a diſaſter which, though himſelf did not perſonally eſcape, his troops, through his admirable management, victorioufly did by a ſtroke of diſpair. But, in the name of all that is juſt, is there any thing ſo little due to a miniſter as any praiſe or honor for any ſhare he might have in the planning an enterprize where there was ſo ſtaringly no " HOPE of a favorable event?" Or, Is it not treating the memory of Wolfe with infinite injuſtice, not to ſay ingratitude, to give him ſuch an one for a partner in the glory of that ever memorable exertion of his; which was, in fact, the foundation of the enſuing conqueſt of all Canada? A country, of which, after the baffling of Vaudreuil's attempt on Quebec, when in our hands, the French were neceſſarily more glad and in a hurry to get rid, than we could be to take poſſeſſion.

Secondly, as to the battle of Minden. There is not, perhaps, in the whole ſtream of hiſtory of human wars, a battle ſo unaccountable, ſo myſterious, ſo nothing-meaning as that ſame battle, whether you conſider the diſpoſitions on both ſides, on that of the enemy or ours; or the iſſue

of

of it, ſo little material, unleſs in encreaſing our infatuation to draw us on to throw away more money and men in future campaigns, in a theatre ſo favorable to the French views of exhauſting and tiring us out. In which light their defeat was, if not of more real ſervice to them, moſt certainly of more detriment to us, than their victory would have been, if that victory would but have opened our eyes on the fruitleſſneſs, or ſelf-deſtruction, from the part we were acting. There is, however, in that battle, nothing clear*, unleſs the valor and in-

---

* Having mentioned a want of clearneſs in the battle itſelf, it is indeed no wonder that the accounts of it ſhould partake of that obſcurity. But in the Extraordinary Gazette of this victory, on Monday, Auguſt the 3d, 1759, there is a circumſtance of which the relation is given in terms ſo contradictory, that if it had been dated from Ireland, I leave the impartial reader to figure to himſelf what a laugh it would have excited here. Speaking of the action of the body of troops under the hereditary Duke againſt the duke de Briſſac, it is ſaid, "At laſt, (the French) finding themſelves ENTIRELY "*ſurrounded*, they had no other reſource but FLIGHT*."---- With *wings*, as the *expreſſion* imports, I preſume; or through a trap-door. *Surrounded* might have paſſed, perhaps, under favor of a latitude of conſtruction juſt allowable in a military ſenſe; but "*entirely! entirely!*" one would imagine entirely took away that latitude.

trepidity

trepidity of our countrymen, who barely not unprepared, as they were, ſhowed the French, the difference between the ſons of freedom and the poppets of ſlavery. But as to the perſonal conſequences of this victory, into which the army had been evidently ſurprized, the two generals, the foreign and the Britiſh, had two very different fates. For as the one had all the glory of it, even himſelf would be extremely puzzled to tell for what: ſo the other was diſgraced there is no-one can poſſibly tell why. But in all this, what applauſe can redound to any Britiſh miniſter who had not, even in thought, any ſhare in this battle, the very commander of which was not ſo much as ſubordinate to the authority of Britiſh councils, or ameſnable to Britiſh juriſdiction? Where on earth, then can any reaſon be alledged for any claim of merit in any miniſter for an event ſo palpably the produce of chance and of the ſheer bravery of the Britiſh troops? Is there any baſe envy or detraction in the rejecting ſuch a claim? Was there in Britain any old woman that, ſitting comfortably by her fire-ſide at the time, might not juſtly boaſt of as great a ſhare of merit in that ſame victory as any Britiſh miniſter, as to the planning part of it? And as to his being the cauſe of it by the deſtination of the Britiſh forces to that particular theatre of the war, let

let the conſequences, actual or probable, decide his pretentions; and, I fancy, that there will hardly be found any to diſpute the glory of them with him.

Thirdly, as to the deſtruction of the French fleet by Admiral Hawke, and add, if you will, that of De la Clue's ſquadron by the late gallant Admiral Boſcawen. Theſe are events which, I preſume, might have taken place, even if there had not ſo much as "half a man" gone to Germany. To ſay the truth, they were on a footing ſo purely Britiſh, that every Britiſh heart muſt glow with pleaſure at the remembrance of them; but with a juſt indignation too at that pleaſure being neceſſarily to be adulterated with the reflexion on any drawback from their importance by the conſequences of our continental connexions; and eſpecially at any part of the honor of them being ſo ridiculouſly attributed as to any one rather more juſtly accuſable of having fore-robbed all our ſucceſſes of their ſolidity, and rendered them as flaſhy as himſelf.

And indeed our ſucceſſes, ſo circumſtanced as they are, have leſs the air of bleſſings, than of being ſent us in mockery of our politics; to prove to us that our ſyſtem is abſolutely ſo bad, that not even ſuch ſucceſſes could poſſibly mend it: while the ſyſtem of the French, only from

its not being an unnational one, and rather good by the badneſs of ours, than from any intrinſic worth of its own, is likely not to be materially hurt, in the end, by the wretchedneſs of their behaviour in the field, or the weakneſs of their councils in the cabinet.

Nor does it in the leaſt derogate from this doubt of the ſtability of our ſucceſſes, that we ſhould not as yet feel, even in apprehenſion, the whole weight of the continental incumbence; of which weight, our exportation of men and money is hitherto but a part. But in that very inſenſibility lay the ſnare. Thence the improvidence of running headlong into alluring meaſures, big with future events, that muſt ultimately be ſure to over-ballance any momentary preſent advantage. Such events then could not come into exiſtence before the fate of things ſhould be decided on the continent; before our great ally ſhould either be reduced to order, or tempted to make a ſeparate peace. Of this laſt, indeed, it may be juſtly ſaid, there needs not be much apprehenſion. Of a peace on any tolerable terms for him, there ſeems, from the condemned face of things with him, ſuch little probability, that it is much more to be dreaded that all that is paſt will have only been paſtorals and rural ſports upon the green, compared

to

to the ſcenes of horror and carnage that may be expected in that theatre of war, where he is now playing ſurely no very enviable part. And indeed, the political horizon every where round, ſo far from clearing up, appears rather to thicken with the threats of war; which, thanks to our happy inſular ſituation, can hardly be ſaid to have begun yet with reſpect to us, unleſs indeed for thoſe of our countrymen actually militating on the continent to no purpoſe, or in America, to what may poſſibly be as little, in the end or at winding up of the account of our continental meaſures. May we not have to thank thoſe meaſures for the experience that the oppoſite of a wrong is not always right.; and that, if our ſupine inactivity, was at one period of time ſo juſt a matter of reproach, it did not at all follow, that all our ſtir and buſtle ſince ſhould be a whit preferable; but, that if our paſſive hiſtory was miſerable indeed, our active was perhaps yet worſe! While all our conduct inſtead of expreſſing the even tenor of a regular, well-concerted national ſyſtem, rather betrayed, in its incoherence, the wildneſs of a delirium, and that kind of convulſive fits and ſtarts which raiſe a ſick perſon for ſome inſtants above his weakneſs, only to re-plunge him into the greater languor, and approach him the nearer to his lat-

ter end. To ſay but the truth, our meaſures have been ſo much in the nature of a ſelf-ſacrifice, that even our enemies affect to pity us, amidſt all our exultation in them; while our friends are really in pain for us, if but on their own account, and dare not connect with us.

In the mean time, we are pluming ourſelves on the floriſhing condition of our trade, eſpecially in the time of actual war. And that condition, if true, is, in fact, one of the ſtrongeſt demonſtrations of the preferableneſs of a naval exertion, eſpecially by an inſular nation; ſince, as has been before remarked, the Dutch could thrive by a war on a maritime plan, and eſpecially on a purely national footing, to ſuch a degree as, beſides collaterally ſupporting their defence by land, they even grew rich and powerful. Never was that famous ſaying of Portius Cato more applicable than to the nature of a naval war. "War will feed itſelf*. And on this Britain might very well have reckoned, if ſhe had been engaged ſingly with France, and even with two or three more nations at once; though not, perhaps, with all Europe; becauſe, in that caſe, to ſay nothing of the hazard of the iſſue, the

---

* *Bellum ſe-ipſum alet.* Liv.

trade

trade on which ſhe depends muſt periſh for want of channels of intercourſe, when every port would be ſhut up, or turned hoſtile to us.

I do not then mean here too ſcrupulouſly to ſcan this our pretention to proſperity of trade.

I will not enquire whether, in that boaſt, we have not overlooked ſome very juſt diſtinctions; whether we have not a little precipitately miſtaken a great deal of hollow buſtle for ſolid buſineſs; or that ſtir of money or of the paper-repreſentatives of money among remittancers, money-lenders to the public, jobbers, lottery-ticket-mongers, which the incurrence of ſuch a debt as of thirty millions muſt neceſſarily create; for a proof of the augmentation of our trade and manufactures, beſides what other proof may, and probably does, appear in their favor in the Cuſtom-houſe books.

I do not examine whether the firſt mentioned kind of floriſhing is not too much of the nature of the temporary emoluments of ſome of our ſea-port towns, which, being chiefly the ſeats of an encreaſed expence, during a war, partially reckon it the beſt time for them; however, that local proſperity may very differently affect the general policy and welfare of the nation.

I do not mean here to liquidate the doubt, whether other nations have not much more than

ourſelves

ourſelves made their advantage of what is loſt to the French trade and navigation by our deſtruction of them; whether the Dutch, the Danes, the Swedes, and eſpecially the Spaniards, who have ſo lately improved their paſſive trade into an active one, beſides other nations, all beginning to feel the ſweets of trade, and conſequently to enter effectually into the commercial ſpirit, muſt not proportionably diminiſh our dealings; whether even the French have not ſome amends made to them by the known and viſible augmentation of their inland-trade; to ſay nothing of the channels open to them in neutral bottoms.

Neither do I propoſe diſcuſſing here, whether that unmeaſurable drain of ſpecie by ſo many millions yearly being exported to the continent, has not already too ſenſibly and even dangerouſly increaſed that diſproportion of the currency of paper-money to the ſpecie in circulation, which was even before complained of.

All this I wave; which is not, perhaps, waving a little; and admit, in its full extent, this boaſted augmentation of trade and manufactures; and of theſe laſt, which is moſt wonderful, even in ſpite of the ſuppoſable detriment to them, from the taking off ſo many hands by the exigencies of the war.

But

But, admitting this profperity, are not we but fo much more to be pitied for the cruel abufe of it? If the ballance of trade is really fo much more in our favor, have we any great caufe to boaft of the millions which feem to be got by the laudable induftry of the fubject, only to be without meafure or mercy flung down that infatiate gulph of our treafures which is for ever open to receive them; that country which inceffantly drains them from us, all in a wild fenfelefs waſte, and even to its own perdition as well as ours; inftead of their being retained in the nation, to be duly circulated through the body of it, fo as to diffufe life, fpirit and abundance through all the members?

Is not there alfo, in this fame boaft of our mercantile acquifition of riches, rather fomewhat impolitic, confidering the ufe that may occafionally be made of it againft ourfeves, both by friends and enemies? When the peace comes to be treated of (for after all it cannot be fuppofed that the war is to be eternal) and the indemnification of the parties that fhall be found to have juft pretenfions to it, comes under conſideration; I do not afk whether the French, and the reft of our enemies, will not naturally point us out for the proper fupplemental paymafters of any deficiency in our allies; but

will

will not our allies themſelves, on the being pinched by ſuch demands, plauſibly enough cry out, that ſince we ourſelves confeſs the proſperity of our trade, and the augmentation of our opulence, in the midſt of all the calamities of war, we muſt be the beſt able to afford ſacrifices to a general peace? Eſpecially too, ſince it is to our bleſſed connections with them, that the partizans of thoſe connections affect to attribute thoſe commercial ſucceſſes. This boaſt, in ſhort, may not be amiſs for anſwering certain pecuniary views at home; but for abroad! abroad! once more I ſay, may it not have an undeſirable effect?

And here be it obſerved, that, by too many inſtances, it but too plainly appears that, if we have declared war againſt the French, we have, in fact, carried it on leſs againſt them than againſt ourſelves; in the openings we have furniſhed them; in the weak ſides we have expoſed to them, and eſpecially in the contenting ourſelves with hruting them, by not incurable random-wounds and chance-blows they have received, in the delirious agitation with which we have thrown about our arms, all the time not heeding that we are ourſelves, if we do not take care, bleeding to death amidſt all our *Io Pæans* and hymns of victory.

But

But may the courſe of this diſorder remit or ceaſe, while there is yet time to hope the criſis may not turn fatally againſt us! And here I appeal to every ſenſible candid reader who will pleaſe to conſider the preſent aſpect of things, whether he can conceive that there ever could exiſt that point of time in which, more than in the preſent one, the crime would be not to ſay truth enough, as to the public affairs; or in which ſuch truth was more wanted? And ſurely, thoſe who to ſerve dare diſpleaſe, do not, at leaſt, deſerve the being ſuſpected of meaning to deceive, or of offering what they do not ſincerely take to be the truth.

Nor will Britons be the gainers of a little, however dear the experience may be bought, if they gain but ſuch a juſt diffidence of the ſecret motives of the moſt plauſible propoſals to them; as, henceforward, not to ſuffer their own virtues, their own love of country, to be turned againſt themſelves; while, by looking only on the fair ſide, that is preſented to them, they do not ſtand to examine all the foul ones it may hide from them. But, by this means, they are not only barbarouſly made ſubſervient to their own ruin; they are not only ſo captivated by falſe ſurfaces, as to applaud both the meaſures and the promoters of theſe meaſures, by which

themſelves, their families and poſterity are ſo likely to ſuffer; but even to conſider, in the light of enemies, thoſe who wiſh them no worſe than for them, to begin to think and judge for themſelves, as the firſt ſtep for them not to continue longer under the power of pernicious illuſions. And who would wiſh to ſee a people deceived that deſerve it ſo little, eſpecially from thoſe by whom they have the moſt been ſo? A people that, with all their faults and follies, (and what people has not ſome, only leſs happily compenſated?) may ſtill be demonſtrated to be the moſt worthy, the moſt noble-ſpirited, and the moſt amiable people on the face of the earth.

And here, to the moſt ungrateful taſk of ſtating cauſes of fear or apprehenſion for the public welfare, ſucceeeds the moſt agreeable proſpect of the hopes of its retrieval or eſtabliſhment by the only way that it can poſſibly be retrieved or eſtabliſhed. And from my making uſe of the expreſſion "the only way," I preſume myſelf ſo much already anticipated by every reader in the aſcertainment of it, that I ſcarce need to ſpecify it; ſince what other way can there poſſibly be imagined, unleſs the conſtitutional exertion of power by the repreſentatives of the nation in parliament?

If

If it is juſt to ſay that, humanly ſpeaking, this nation cannot well be undone, but by the neglect, the indolence, the corruption, or the prevarication of a parliament; it is alſo as juſt to aver, that, in any conjuncture of danger, it is only by a parliament that ſhe can be defended from it, and that effectual care can be taken that her welfare receives no detriment.

Such an aſſembly as that muſt undoubtedly be ſuppoſed to contain a number of unexceptionable ſubjects, untainted with corruption or factiouſneſs, neutrals as to any of the parties that have been ſeen to diſgrace the political drama, and alike ridiculous in their moſt illuſtrious quarrels, as in their moſt ſerene unanimity; neutrals, I ſay, in whom great talents, united to the advantages of birth, rank and fortune, form a merit that muſt render them infinitely ſuperior to any thing ſo extremely low, as the ſtooping to be the implicit tame tools of any little miniſters to whom, was their country even dear to them, nothing is perhaps leſs known than its Good, or their own either.

It is then greatly to be hoped, or, at leaſt, not to be deſpaired of, that the nation will not look up in vain to repreſentatives worthy of her ſacred truſt in them. It is not of ſuch as theſe that there will be to be ſaid, that they have fil-

lily thrown away immenſe ſums to get into parliament only for the diſhonor of being wanting to their duty, as if ſuch a ſtation was any protection againſt a juſt contempt, a plea of privilege to be worthleſs; or, rather, not a reproach the more, and the keener for being ſo.

It is not the men of ſolid ſenſe that, at leaſt in the cool of their minds, on reflecting upon what is paſt, will be liable to be dazzled with the glare of falſe brilliants, that will take figures of flowered fuſtian, or theatrical rants for genuine eloquence, vehemence for ſincerity, the petulance of invective for the true ſpirit of liberty, and much leſs yet for that of patriotiſm. It is not, in ſhort, on ſuch as theſe, that out-brazening will paſs for out-reaſoning.

And ſurely, in the preſent poſition of things, no incentive can be wanting to the repreſentatives of their country, to do her juſtice. Their own ſtake in the land, their own honor, and, what ought not to go for a little, the preſumable horror and diſdain in them of reſembling, in any thing, certain perſonages, muſt all conſpire to recommend to them their not deſerting her in the preſent, and perhaps never greater need.

From men then of ſpirit, of taſte, and of true worth, better things may be expected, than that meanneſs, of all meanneſſes ſurely the moſt vul-

gar

gar and the moſt deſpicable; the imagining it to be ſomething of a fine ſuperb air, that of pretending to repair wrongs by a pernicious perſiſtence in them, and of noſing, in a ſilly bravade, the proteſtation of even their own ſenſe and judgment againſt them.

At leaſt, they could not have for excuſe any difficulty of knowing what to think of the merit of certain paſt tranſactions; ſuch, for example, as the renewal of the broken ties with the continent, and the re-involving us with it after the breach of the convention; of any ſhare in the guilt of which it is to be hoped that this nation will, upon a fair examination, be amply cleared, to the ſatisfaction of all Europe, of any authority having been, in a national way, given to any of her ſubjects to abet ſuch a perfidy as the French have dared to impute to her, who are themſelves, it ſeems, the criminals.

It is then ſtill happily in the power of the conſtitutional guardians of this country, to ſhow to the aſtoniſhed Univerſe, a ſight truly worthy of the majeſty of a great and free people; a ſight that might do honor to the Romans even in the greateſt days of Rome; the ſight of a nation, by her legal repreſentatives, ſeverely mounting the ſupreme tribunal of her own judicature, there entering into judgment with herſelf, and even,

where

D761
E61+
X9601.

where natural equity ſhould require it, not ſcrupling to condemn herſelf. An effort of which, nothing but the ſublimeſt virtue could make hes capable, as well as the juſteſt policy recommend to her, for the replacing her intereſt once more on her national bottom, and for repairing any breaches both in that and in her reputation, which have ſuffered ſo deeply for her having ſtood tottering ſo long on a diminutive foreign one. And thus this nation, proceeding only the more formidable for ſuch a diſplay of the union of her juſtice with her power, could not fail of ſtriking terror into her enemies, at the ſame time that ſhe will re-invite the forfeited confidence of her diſcouraged or diſguſted friends and natural allies.

THE END.

ERRATA.

Page 20, Line 16, for *almoſt*, read *utmoſt*.
71, 25, *now*, *own*.